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INTRODUCTION

Despite serving for more than sixteen years on the Supreme
Court of the United States and authoring more than 300 opinions,
Pierce Butler is one of the lesser-known Justices in American history.
When his name is mentioned by constitutional scholars, it is usually to
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. This Article benefited greatly
from the excellent research assistance provided by Jeff Justman. I would especially like to thank
Jeff for helping me sort through the numerous digital pictures that I took of primary source
documents housed at the Minnesota Historical Society and the Library of Congress. Special
thanks go to the librarians and staff of those two excellent institutions as well as to those of
Carleton College and the University of Minnesota Law School. I would also like to express my
special appreciation to Mrs. Pierce Butler III, who kindly gave Jeff and me permission to
examine Justice Butler's remaining private papers. Thanks also to the participants in the Legal
History Colloquium Series at the University of Minnesota, the Conference on "Judges and
Judging" at American University's Washington College of Law, and the Vanderbilt Law Review
Symposium for their excellent comments on an early draft. Excellent suggestions were also
provided by the faculties of St. Louis University School of Law and the University of Kansas
School of Law at faculty workshops. Moreover, I would like to acknowledge the excellent
comments and suggestions provided by Dale Carpenter, Jim Ely, Allan Erbsen, Michael
Gerhardt, Arthur Hellman, Scot Powe, and Anders Walker on an earlier draft. Of course, any
remaining errors in this Article are my own.
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deride him for being one of the so-called "Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse," a group of Justices that invalidated efforts by politicians,
especially President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to enact New Deal
reforms.1 Scholars have characterized his role in the development of
constitutional law as "minimal,"2 and he is the subject of only one
full-length book, A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed, which focuses
almost exclusively on his appointment to the Supreme Court rather
3
than his background or contributions to the development of the law.
Some scholars have gone even further by characterizing Butler's
tenure on the Court as a "failure," and when he is mentioned, it is
often on lists of the least successful Supreme Court Justices of all
4
time.
Butler was not one of the great Justices in the Court's history,
but he is deeply understudied, likely underestimated, and regrettably
misunderstood. Relying on primary source documents housed at the
Library of Congress, the University of Washington, the Carleton
College archives, and the University of Minnesota archives, this
Article argues that several factors account for Butler's lack of
treatment in the scholarly literature. First, Butler wrote in highly
technical areas of the law, such as public utilities regulation and tax
law, which are of relatively low public salience and are consistently
ignored by constitutional scholars. Second, Butler's approach to
opinion writing stressed simplicity and minimalism, and it was rare
indeed when he used rhetorical flourishes to argue a point. He was, in
short, a "technician," content to decide technical matters using a
mechanical approach. Third, Butler served with a highly
distinguished group of jurists and American historical figuresincluding William Howard Taft, Benjamin Cardozo, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and Louis Brandeis-some of whom are consistently rated as
the most successful Supreme Court Justices of all time. When
compared against such an accomplished group, it is unsurprising that
Butler is discussed less frequently than his colleagues. Finally, in
those areas in which he wrote extensively, such as economic liberties,
public utilities regulation, and taxation, he found himself on the
wrong side of history. As a strict adherent to Lochner, for example, his
opinions favoring property rights and economic liberties were
essentially overruled by the end of his tenure on the Court. Even his
1.

E.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical

Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 930 n.218 (2008).
2.
NORMAN BINDLER, THE CONSERVATIVE COURT, 1910-1930, at 204 (1986).
3.
See generally DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED (1964).
4.
E.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES:
STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1978).
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innovative jurisprudence in the fields of taxation and public utilities
regulation was largely curtailed by the end of the 1930s. For these
four reasons, Butler is often neglected or characterized as a failure.
While it is true that many of Butler's opinions have not had
lasting influence, merely labeling Butler as one of the "Four
Horsemen" or an arch-conservative ignores the nuances in his
jurisprudence, such as his surprisingly pro-defendant criminal rights
positions and his robust view of private property rights. A more
systematic examination of his votes reveals some philosophical
distinctions between Butler and those who are conventionally viewed
as his ideological allies on the Court, such as Justices McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter. This Article not only accounts for the
reasons why Butler has been neglected by scholars, but it also
provides a more complete picture of him by closely analyzing his
professional career and judicial opinions.
Part I describes Butler's family background, including his early
life as a child of immigrants and pioneers of the American West. Part
II discusses his professional career until his nomination to the
Supreme Court, including his representation of such diverse interests
as farmers, railroads, and national governments. Butler's nomination
and the controversy it engendered is the subject of Part III. Finally,
Part IV confronts the conventional view of Butler as a monolithic
conservative by discussing the many nuances of his jurisprudence; the
Part includes a constitutional reassessment that challenges some of
the traditional views regarding his judicial philosophy. Part IV further
analyzes the reasons why Butler has largely been ignored by scholars
despite being part of a dominant coalition of Justices during the 1920s
and early 1930s. Finally, the Article concludes by making the modest
claim that, though Butler can hardly be classified as one of the great
Justices of all time, he has made some modest contributions to the
development of American law and should not be viewed as a failure.

I. THE EARLY YEARS
There is often a parallel in greatness. The babe Pierce Butler was sleeping-sleeping in
the womb-the night Booth killed Lincoln. Their years did not lap but their lives
paralleled. Both were from the soil; both were born in a house of logs; both had to
struggle for learning; both became great lawyers; under their own power both went from
windrow to Washington; both were champions of democracy and individual liberty; both
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were stout defenders of government by the people
and for the people; both freely gave to
5
their country the last full measure of devotion.

Pierce Butler was not born into a family of great wealth or
political power, as were many of his contemporaries on the Supreme
Court. 6 To the contrary, Butler's parents, Patrick and Mary Ann
Butler, immigrated to the United States from Glendalough, County
Wicklow, Ireland, following the Irish Potato Famine of 1848. 7 In 1852,
they settled in Gallena, Illinois, where Patrick managed a tavern in a
local hotel.8 By all accounts, Patrick was a successful tavern keeper,
serving many of the famous figures of the time, including future
President and Union General Ulysses S. Grant. 9 After marrying Mary
Ann in 1855,10 Patrick Butler, along with his wife and new daughter
Kate, journeyed on a steamboat north along the Mississippi River and
ultimately settled in Waterford Township, Minnesota, located
approximately thirty-five miles south of St. Paul.1 1 There, the Butlers
built a log cabin to house their ever-expanding family, which
eventually included eight additional children: Walter, Isabella, John,
12
William, Pierce, Cooley, Emmett, and Effie.
Butler's childhood was characterized by hard work and a
simple home life. Along with his eight siblings, 13 he participated in the
daily chores, which included planting, plowing, cultivating,
harvesting, and tending to the family's farm animals. 4 A robust
education was also an important part of Butler's childhood; indeed, his
father supplemented his education by teaching him Latin and German
5.
John T. Harding, Address at the Memorial of Mr. Justice Butler at the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: An Appreciation of Mr. Justice Butler (Mar. 4, 1940)
(transcript on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
6.
Indeed, the most influential position for Patrick Butler, Pierce's father, prior to his
emigration to America was his participation in Sir Roger Murcheson's survey of Ireland. See
John Paul Frank, The Confirmation of Pierce Butler 1 (1940) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The
University of Wisconsin), availableat http://minds.wisconsin.edu/handle/1793/28616.
7.
Letter from Robert O'Sullivan to John D. Carmody (Jan. 23, 1940) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
8.
See DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 4; UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT, IN MEMORIAM: HON. PIERCE BUTLER 12 (1940) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM]
(noting that Patrick Butler came to America "either in 1851 or 1852").
9.
DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 4.
10. Different sources cite different dates for Patrick Butler's marriage to Mary Ann.
Compare EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 12 (suggesting that the Butlers married
in 1854), with DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 4 (listing a marriage date of 1855).
11. Frank, supra note 6, at 1.
12. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 4; Evelyn Burke, The Butler Family, NORTHWEST LIFE, Mar.
1944, at 18-20.
13. The youngest child in the family, Effie, passed away at the age of eight. See sources
cited supra note 12.
14. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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at the dinner table.' 5 When Butler turned fifteen, he began teaching
classes at the county school, where he was known as a strict
disciplinarian. 16
By the age of sixteen, Butler had impressed his family with his
extraordinary intellectual gifts. As a result, his parents decided to
send him to college by enrolling him in preparatory school at Carleton
College in Northfield, Minnesota. 17 While in Carleton's preparatory
department, he continued with his chores on the family farm,
including waking up early each morning to "wrestle milk cans" at a
nearby dairy.18 Butler would often study deep into the night and then
wake up early again to complete his chores. 19 One newspaper article
later summarized an average day for Butler: "[He] had to fill the wood
box every night or get trimmed, and he filled it. As he got a little older
he had to wade around in the mud and get the cows and milk them
20
and then walk three miles to Carleton College and home again."
After West Point denied him admission, 21 Butler enrolled in
Carleton's regular academic program. 22 It was in that program that he
first encountered the type of laissez-faire economic philosophy that
would later characterize his jurisprudence on the Supreme Court. In
particular, Butler's political economy textbook, written by the famous
congressman and economist Amasa Walker, argued against
15.

Id. at 5.

16.

David Burner, Pierce Butler, in 3 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,

1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1082, 1082 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds.,
Chelsea House Publishers, 3d ed. 1997). Butler punished unruly students through corporal
punishment and, on one notable occasion, he physically disciplined a student, threw a pail of
water on his bleeding face, and then continued to teach the class as usual. Id.
17. Francis Joseph Brown, The Social and Economic Philosophy of Pierce Butler, 13 CATH.
U. AM. STUD. SOC. 1, 1 (1945); Interview by Robert Goff and Lila Johnson with Pierce Butler III,
attorney, Doherty, Rumble, and Butler, in Minneapolis, Minn. 6 (June 19, 1968) [hereinafter
Pierce Butler III Interview] (on file with the author). The oral history with Butler's grandson,
Pierce Butler III, appears to be based on personal knowledge because, during the course of the
interview, Butler stated that he "knew... [his] grandfather well." Id. at 3.
18. THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
CLERK IN FDR'S WASHINGTON 76 (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002)
[hereinafter KNOX MEMOIR]; Eddy Gilmore, Justice Butler Rose from West, EVENING BULL.PHILA., Feb. 24, 1937 (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) (noting that the "valedictory
music of Butler's youth" was the "clanking of milk cans he wrestled for college money").
19. KNOX MEMOIR, supra note 18, at 76.
20. '"Tergiverous Tim," Tales of the Town, NORTHFIELD NEWS (Minn.), Jan. 27, 1922, at 2.
Some sources, however, suggest that Butler rode his horse to school instead of walking. E.g.,
KNOX MEMOIR, supranote 18, at 76.
21. Butler's rejection from West Point potentially spared his life. The candidate who gained
admission through the "competitive examination" process was killed in the Philippines in 1901 or
1902. Memorandum from Francis D. Butler to Sunnie Hershberg 1 (Jan. 6, 1961) [hereinafter
Hershberg Memorandum] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
22. Brown, supra note 17, at 1.
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government intervention in economic affairs and espoused a distinct
laissez-faire philosophy. 23 One passage in the book made clear that
"the government is best which governs least" and that when
individual economic activities could accomplish a goal, "the
government should undertake nothing." 24 Of particular significance to
his later jurisprudence, the text also took a firm stand on the freedom
to contract in an employment relationship, stating that "the law
cannot say how much [the laborer] shall accept for wages, how many
hours shall constitute a day's work, nor how much the employer shall
give him."25 Foretelling how Butler would later view President
Roosevelt's New Deal reforms, Walker's text further explained that
social welfare programs should not shelter the "indolent and wasteful"
and that the "taint of beggary" would attach to those accepting
26
governmental assistance.
Butler also studied constitutional law at Carleton, which
further reinforced the laissez-faire philosophy that was emphasized in
his economics course. 27 Indeed, he studied Judge Thomas Cooley's
ConstitutionalLimitations, a book described at the time as a "fecund
source of laissez-faire constitutional principles." 28 Given his childhood
experiences and strong work ethic, it is hardly surprising that the
economic and constitutional principles he studied while at Carleton
resonated and stuck with him throughout his career.

23. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 6-7. Walker defined the term "laissez-faire" by recounting a
famed meeting between a French finance minister and French manufacturers: "When a
distinguished French minister of finance called the manufacturers of that country to Paris, and
asked what he could do for them, they made well-known the answer, 'Laissez nous faire.' "
AMASA WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 115 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1866). Walker continued: "It will, doubtless, be a matter of profound
astonishment to the future historian, that a people who had a free and untrammeled industry,
with natural advantages for the most productive agriculture in the world and for the legitimate
growth of every kind of manufacture, should ever have asked for restrictions upon trade." Id. at
115-16. For purposes of this Article, therefore, I define "laissez-faire" as the theory of political
economy favoring development of national industry without government regulation. See also
Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 20
(1987) (defining proposals to constitutionalize laissez-faire as advocating the interpretation of
"the Constitution as a general guarantor of free markets") [hereinafter Posner, Economic
Document]; Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 620
(1969) (defining the notion of "laissez faire" as "leaving the function of determining price and
output to the market").
24. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Walker's text).
25. Id. (same).
26. Id. (same).
27. Id. at 6-7. Ironically, Butler received a failing grade in his constitutional law class.
Burner, supra note 16, at 1082.
28. Id. (quoting CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 30 (1954)).
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Though he would later take "little if any part in religious
organizations" down the road, 29 Catholicism took on an increasingly
important role in Butler's life while he was attending Carleton. 30 He
enrolled in classes on "Moral Philosophy" and "Evidences of
Christianity," the latter of which emphasized a belief in God and
"things deemed essential to character building on the basis of
Christianity." 31 By the time Butler graduated from college, religion
was a central aspect of his life. In his 1887 graduation speech, he
emphasized the importance of the Roman Catholic Church and its
32
positive influence on the world.
While at Carleton, Butler also cemented his debating and
speaking skills through activities that he would later characterize as
among the most significant aspects of his education. 33 Specifically,
Butler often debated and read speeches aloud on a variety of subjects
with Frederick Dickson, a close friend and a future Ramsey County
judge. 34 As Judge Dickson later recalled, Butler was "ever fond of any
argument, and in these debates indulged in by the students he
developed an ability in argument for which he was later distinguished
35
in his law practice."
In addition, Butler developed a number of friendships while
attending Carleton. Butler was a large, imposing man who excelled in
such sports as wrestling and boxing, and he was "popular among his
fellow students and the people of Northfield" because he "made friends
easily and held them well." 36 His experiences at Carleton also further
sharpened and reinforced his strong work ethic. Indeed, he graduated
from college at the relatively young age of twenty-one. 37 That strong
work ethic would quickly propel him toward the top of the legal
profession.

29. Hershberg Memorandum, supranote 21, at 1.
30. It is interesting that Butler's Catholicism played such a prominent role in his early life
given that Carleton was a Congregational institution at the time and that Patrick Butler was
Protestant. See Brown, supra note 17, at 1; Pierce Butler III Interview, supra note 17, at 6
(noting that Pierce "took instruction and became a Catholic" partly because of the "indifference to
the religion of his father who was from Trinity College, which is, of course, a Protestant
institution").
31. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 5-6 (internal citation omitted).
32. Id. at 19 (internal citation omitted).
33. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 14.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Burner, supra note 16, at 1082.
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II. A RISING LEGAL STAR
His appearance proclaimed the man! The large, powerful physique, the heavy, slightly
stooped shoulders, the large head, the striking face, firm mouth and protruding chin
indicated a man of power and resolute purpose. It cannot be said that he was affable in
the sense that he was condescending, nor that he was amiable in the sense that he
sought popularity by pleasing. He was, however, a very friendly, warm-hearted,
companionable man. He liked his friends, who were legion. He treasured and enjoyed
their company. He was simple in keeping with his origin. There were no classes among
those he called friend. He never forgot the people with whom he associated in early life.
There was about him an indefinable reserve-the reserve which always accompanies
38
strength. He was a man easy to meet, but dangerous to oppose.

Upon graduation from Carleton, Butler began a legal
apprenticeship with the firm of Pinch & Twohy in St. Paul,
Minnesota. 39 During his apprenticeship, Butler became acquainted
with Walter H. Sanborn, who later became a judge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and one of Butler's most ardent
supporters. 40 Butler found the apprenticeship intellectually engaging,
and his inquisitive legal mind began to emerge during his time with
the firm. In fact, in 1888, at the relatively young age of twenty-two,
Butler was admitted to the bar after Sanborn quizzed him in open
41
court, which was a common practice at the time.
Perhaps the most important moment of Butler's apprenticeship
occurred at a dinner with one of the firm's namesakes, John Twohy,
who introduced Butler to Anna Cronin, the half sister of Twohy's
wife. 4 2 On many subsequent occasions, Pierce and Anna were seated
together during the Sunday evening dinners at Twohy's home. 43 The
two grew quite fond of one another, began a courtship, and eventually
married in 1891. 44 Over the course of their steady forty-eight-year
marriage, Pierce and Anna had eight children. 45 Butler later
attributed much of his professional success to Anna's constant support
and assistance.

38. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Judge Thomas O'Brien). I
acknowledge that remembrances of individuals often provide an extremely favorable impression
of the deceased, and thus might provide a skewed picture of Butler. Nonetheless, it is necessary
to rely, at least to a limited extent, on these sources because of Butler's order to destroy many of
his public papers upon his death. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
39. Brown, supra note 17, at 1.
40. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 7-8.
41. Id. at8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Burner, supra note 16, at 1083.
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After leaving Pinch & Twohy, Butler entered into legal practice
with Stan Donnelly, who was the son of former congressman and
populist leader Ignatius Donnelly. 46 After a short tenure in private
practice, 47 Butler became the assistant to newly elected Ramsey
County Attorney Thomas O'Brien after giving a moving speech during
the 1890 Ramsey County Democratic Convention. 48 Just twenty-four
years old at the time, Butler became a successful and respected
prosecutor. According to a colleague, Butler "had a remarkable
memory, and this, with his impressive appearance, quick wit, mental
alertness, and complete mastery of facts, made him a formidable and
' 49
effective cross-examiner."
Just two years later, Butler easily won election as Ramsey
County Attorney. 50 Butler continued to prosecute cases with great
integrity and skill, developing one of the highest success rates in the
history of Ramsey County. 5 1 The Minnesota Law Journal stated at the
time that he had "no equal for his age as a criminal lawyer in the
state," and his "integrity, ability, and fearlessness" made him one of
the most popular young lawyers in the county. 52 Butler was not afraid
to prosecute powerful interests or even his own allies. On one notable
occasion, he convicted fellow Catholic Democrat Ed Murphy of St. Paul
on a request from the Women's Christian Temperance Union
("WCTU").5 3 He personally and covertly gathered evidence against
Murphy by frequenting his saloon. 54 When Butler later won the case,
the WCTU was so pleased that it passed a resolution of appreciation
55
for his "manly" and "masterful" job in handling the case.

46.
47.

Brown, supra note 17, at 1.
While in private practice, Butler also managed his family's mining affairs. RONALD F.

HOWELL, CONSERVATIVE INFLUENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1923-1937: THE
JUDICIAL THEORY OF JUSTICES VAN DEVANTER, MCREYNOLDS, SUTHERLAND AND BUTLER 29

(1952) (noting that Butler handled "all the legal work of his five brothers who were engaged in a
prosperous contracting and mining business" in Northern Minnesota); Pierce Butler III
Interview, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining that the Butler brothers were innovative in that they
were the first to use "standard gauge railway equipment" and "really large shovels and drag
lines" in the iron-ore mines of Northern Minnesota).
48.

DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 8.

49. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of Wilfrid Rumble, Butler's
employee and later partner in Butler's firm).
50. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 8.
51. Id. at9.
52. Id. (internal citation omitted).
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id. at 8-9.
55. Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted).
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After two full terms as Ramsey County Attorney, Butler
returned to private practice. 56 Butler partnered with two experienced
attorneys, Jared How and Homer Eller, and opened a general legal
practice representing both plaintiffs and defendants in a variety of
areas. 57 In one case, Butler represented St. Olaf College in a will
contest involving a substantial sum of money. 58 In another, he
defended an association of dairy farmers against a charge that they
colluded in marketing milk. 59 He even defended a group of thirty
businessmen who were accused of tarring and feathering a Minnesota
60
farmer who held stock in a Nonpartisan League weekly newspaper.
Butler was best known at the time, however, for his corporate
defense work. In fact, colleagues called him "the foremost corporat[e]
lawyer of the Northwest,"6 1 and opined that his courtroom skills made
him a fierce adversary-so much so that it earned him the nickname
"Fierce Butler."62 Attorneys who worked with Butler at the time
recalled that "witness after witness of the plaintiff left the witness
stand in about the condition of Tomlinson's soul, after it was
'shredded.' "63 His zealous advocacy for his corporate clients led to a
position as corporate counsel for the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis,
and Omaha Railroad, a job that he held for six years. 64 That job
required him to defend the railroad against personal injury and
freight claims arising out of Minnesota and western Wisconsin. 65 Once
again, Butler's strong work ethic was apparent to his colleagues. His
friends noted that he
devoted longer and longer hours to his practice. There appeared to be no limit to his
capacity for work and for long-sustained mental effort. Office hours for him meant any
time from early morning until midnight. The eight-hour day was then the Union

56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Pierce Butler III Interview, supra note 17, at 8 (characterizing Butler's firm
as "highly individualistic," without particular commitment to any kind of legal work or any
particular group of clients).
58. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT BAR, PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN MEMORY OF PIERCE BUTLER, JANUARY 27, 1940, at 19

[hereinafter SUPREME COURT MEMORIAM] (statement of Wilfred Rumble).
59. Id.
60. M.H. Hedges, Pierce Butler: Friendof Intolerance,in BINDLER, supranote 2, at 124, 125.
The Nonpartisan League was a political party that advocated state control of mills, grain
elevators, banks, and other farm-related industries in order to reduce the power of corporate
political interests in Minnesota. See generally CAROL E. JENSON, AGRARIAN PIONEER IN CIVIL
LIBERTIES: THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE IN MINNESOTA DURING WORLD WAR 1 (1986).

61.

Hedges, supra note 60, at 125.

62.

HOWELL, supra note 47, at 30.

63.
64.
65.

DANELSKI, supranote 3, at 11.
Id. at 9.
Letter from Robert O'Sullivan to John D. Carmody, supra note 7.
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the eightstandard. He once jestingly remarked that he was strict in the observance 6of
6
hour schedule, eight hours in the forenoon and eight hours in the afternoon.

After six successful years with the railroad, Butler decided to
return to his old law firm. By then William Mitchell, who would later
become Solicitor General of the United States during President Calvin
Coolidge's Administration and U.S. Attorney General under President
Herbert Hoover, had joined the firm as a partner. 67 Capitalizing on his
tenure with the railroad, Butler's practice focused on general litigation
with a particular emphasis on railroad valuation cases. 68 Perhaps his
most famous case on the plaintiffs side was his representation of
injured passengers of the Minneapolis Street Railway Company,
where he recovered $50,000 for the plaintiffs-a record verdict in that
type of case at the time. 69 He also successfully defended a personal
injury action brought against the Canadian Northern Railroad at both
trial and on appeal. 70 During the appeal, Butler's advocacy skills
thoroughly impressed Judge Willis Van Devanter, then an Eighth
Circuit judge, who would later become one of Butler's most ardent
supporters during Butler's consideration as a Supreme Court
71
nominee.
In 1908, Butler was elected President of the Minnesota Bar
Association, a position that enabled him to lobby for legal reforms in
the Minnesota legislature. 72 He was instrumental, for example, in
pushing for the enactment of Minnesota's first workers' compensation
law. 73 In an important speech before the Association, Butler
questioned whether employees working in hazardous positions that
served the public interest should be held responsible for their on-thejob injuries. 74 He concluded that "in certain occupations attended by
grave and peculiar risks of injury to employees, there should be
compensation for injuries .. unless such injury was the result of
66. MEMORIAL SERVICES FOR DECEASED MEMBERS-RAMSEY COUNTY BAR 6 (Mar. 23, 1940)
[hereinafter RAMSEY COUNTY BAR MEMORIAM] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review)
(remarks of M.J. Doherty).
67. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 10.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Memorandum from Francis Butler to David J. Danelski, Professor, Univ. of Wash. 4
(Mar. 25, 1963) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter Danelski Memorandum].
70. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 13.
71. Of course, Van Devanter and Butler would later become two pillars of the so-called
"Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," who would impede President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
New Deal reforms for a number of years. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1997) (listing Butler and Van Devanter as two of the so-called
"Four Horsemen").
72. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 10.
73. Brown, supra note 17, at 96 & nn.53-54 (internal citation omitted).
74. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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wrongful conduct on the part of the injured person or occurred by
reason of irresistible force or an act of providence." 75
In light of his previous public service and growing national
reputation, Butler was asked by then-Attorney General George
Wickersham in 1909 to serve as a Special Assistant Attorney General
in the prosecution of midwestern meat packers and millers for their
suspected violation of federal law. 76 In the first case, Butler
successfully convinced a Chicago jury that the meatpackers were
conspiring to illegally fix the prices of dressed meat and livestock in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 77 In the other case, Butler
convicted the millers of producing adulterated flour-flour bleached
78
with nitrogen peroxide-in violation of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
Though Butler ultimately lost both cases on appeal, 79 Wickersham
stated that Butler had done "as well as [he] could" in presenting the
80
cases and called him "the foremost lawyer in his part of the country."
Further bolstering his reputation as an outstanding corporate
attorney, Butler represented a number of railroads before the U.S.
Supreme Court in the well-known Minnesota Rate Cases.8 1 In those
cases, the railroads challenged a decision of the Railroad & Warehouse
Commission of the State of Minnesota that set maximum rates for
passenger and freight transportation at an artificially low level for
purely intrastate commerce. 82 Butler argued to the Court that the
rates were so low that "they amounted to an unconstitutional
interference with interstate commerce" and were "confiscatory" in
nature.8 3 Although the Court found no violation based on the
Commerce Clause, Justice Hughes's majority opinion drew
substantially upon Butler's theory of the case, which stated that
Congress had authority to override state rate laws. 84 Indeed, the
75.

Id. at 96-97.

76.

DANELSKI, supranote 3, at 11.

77. Id. at 11-12.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 12; see Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. United States, 202 F. 615 (8th Cir. 1913);
United States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
80. Burner, supra note 16, at 1083.
81. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 371 (1913) (listing Pierce Butler as the appellees'
attorney).
82. Id. at 420 ("The question we have now before us, essentially, is whether, after the
passage of the interstate commerce act, and its amendment, the state continued to possess the
state-wide authority which it formerly enjoyed to prescribe reasonable rates for its exclusively
internal traffic.").
83. Id. at 380.
84. Id. at 432-33:
If the situation has become such, by reason of the interblending of the
interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers, that adequate

2009]

PIERCE BUTLER

707

Court's holding caused some commentators to proclaim that Butler
had "lost the battle but won the war."8 5 The force of the Court's
statements giving Congress broad regulatory authority over railroad
rates would be fully realized a year later in the Shreveport Rate Cases,
in which the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") had authority over even purely intrastate rates if they
86
substantially burdened interstate traffic.
Butler and Mitchell continued to grow their practice, and both
eventually achieved national reputations.8 7 After Congress passed the
Railroad Valuation Act of 1913, which required the ICC to set
property values for railroads operating in interstate commerce, Butler
was appointed as general counsel to represent a group of western
railroads before the ICC. 8 Butler was again successful during this
lengthy, four-year project: he convinced the ICC to raise the legal
value of railroad property, which "resulted in the ... enormous
89
valuation of nineteen billion dollars for the railroads of the nation."
Butler continued to represent railroads in the ensuing years,
and in 1921, the Canadian government asked him to represent it in a
condemnation action against the Grand Trunk Railway. 90 Pursuant to
an act of Parliament, three arbitrators were appointed to hear the
case in order to determine the value of the railroad property
condemned by the Canadian government. 91 The railroad appointed
William Howard Taft, former President and future Chief Justice of the
United States, to serve as its arbitrator. 92 Even though the railroad
was eligible for $64 million in statutory damages, the arbitrators

regulation of their interstate rates cannot be maintained without imposing
requirements with respect to their intrastate rates which substantially affect
the former, it is for Congress to determine, within the limits of its
constitutional authority over interstate commerce and its instruments the
measure of the regulation it should supply.
85. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 6.
86. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914):
While these decisions sustaining the Federal power relate to measures
adopted in the interest of the safety of persons and property, they illustrate
the principle that Congress, in the exercise of its paramount power, may
prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate
commercial intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to the
injury of interstate commerce.
87. See DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that Butler's firm became "regarded as
one of the leading firms in the state").
88. Danelski Memorandum, supranote 69, at 5.
89. Hedges, supra note 60, at 125.
90. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 13.
91. Danelski Memorandum, supra note 69, at 5.
92. Id.
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ultimately decided to award the railroad nothing. 93 Even Taft, who
dissented from the ruling, was thoroughly impressed by Butler's
advocacy skills. 94 Fortuitously, Butler and Taft also stayed in the
same hotel in Montreal and struck up a friendship that would last for
years. 95 In fact, Butler ate breakfast with Taft the morning after Taft
was nominated for the position of Chief Justice by President Warren
Harding. 96 One of Taft's sons later recalled that Butler was "one of
[Taft's] dearest friends." 97 Taft's friendship turned out to be
instrumental to Butler's eventual nomination to the Supreme Court in
1922.98

III. A DIFFICULT CONFIRMATION
Those groundless objections made by irresponsible people and foolish delays because of
them have been more or less annoying to me, but I have not worried. 99

In 1921, William Howard Taft was confirmed as the Chief
Justice of an aging Supreme Court. Although the constitutional power
to appoint new Justices rests expressly with the President, Taft took it
upon himself to find suitable replacements for a number of aging
Justices facing imminent retirement-such as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Joseph McKenna, William Day, and Mahlon Pitney.10 0 Of particular

93.

Id. at 14.

94.

SUPREME COURT MEMORIAM, supra note 58, at 13 (noting the "warm friendship" Butler

developed with Taft, despite Taft's dissent in the arbitration).
95. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 13.
96. Danelski Memorandum, supra note 69, at 7.
97. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5.
98. See DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 49-55 (noting that Taft gave "encouraging words to
Butler" and wrote that Butler "would make a great Justice of our Court"). In fact, Butler became
so close to Taft and regarded him as such a highly capable Chief Justice that when Taft died and
President Hoover was looking for a replacement, Butler took it upon himself to contact Charles
Evans Hughes, the author of the opinion against Butler in the Minnesota Rate Cases, in an effort
to persuade Hughes to become "available" for the job. Butler then recommended to President
Hoover that Hughes be nominated to replace Taft as Chief Justice. Pierce Butler III Interview,
supra note 17, at 9-10. The story of Butler's role in the Hughes nomination has not been
reported previously.
99. Letter from Pierce Butler to William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States (Dec. 14, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
100. See DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 39-40. Though not normally the province of the Chief
Justice, Taft "expected to be consulted" by Harding with respect to any vacancies on the Supreme
Court. Id. at 40. As Danelski explained, not only had Taft given greater thought to potential
replacements for aging Justices, but Taft had also served as an advisor to Harding on a variety of
matters, including the composition of Harding's cabinet right after the presidential election. Id.
at 29-30. Accordingly, as an informal advisor to Harding and a former President himself, Taft
felt free to make suggestions to Harding regarding suitable replacements for vacancies on the
federal courts. Id. at 33-34.
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concern to Taft, many of these Justices were beginning to display
signs of advanced age that hampered their performance on the
Court. 10 1
In 1922, one of those imminent retirements occurred when
Justice Joseph Day announced his retirement after becoming ill.102
Taft actively searched for a Catholic Democrat of preeminent national
reputation to fill Day's seat because Joseph McKenna, the Court's only
Catholic Justice, was in ill health and was rumored to be considering
retirement as well. 0 3 According to political scientist David
Danelski,10 4 who thoroughly chronicled Pierce Butler's nomination to
the Supreme Court, the selection of a Catholic Democrat was intended
to strengthen President Harding's relationship with congressional
Democrats, while avoiding the necessity of finding a Catholic
Republican, of which there were few. 1°5 In other words, the selection of
a Catholic Democrat would "kill several political pigeons with a single
06
stone."1
Taft first looked to John W. Davis, the premier Supreme Court
advocate of his time and one of the namesakes of the famous New
York law firm Davis, Polk & Wardwell.' 0 7 Davis was an obvious
candidate, having served previously as a U.S. congressman from West
Virginia, Solicitor General of the United States, and ambassador to
the United Kingdom. 08 In addition, Davis had sought the Democratic
nomination for the presidency in 1920 and had argued a number of
cases before the Supreme Court during his tenure as Solicitor
General. 10 9 Though not Catholic, Davis was the most attractive choice

101. Id. at 39-40 (describing Justice McKenna's "senility," Justice Holmes's "difficulty
breathing," and Justice Pitney's "stroke"). Indeed, Joseph McKenna was so mentally infirm by
the end of his tenure on the Court that he drafted an opinion that was contrary to the result
agreed upon by every member of the Court, including himself. Id. at 40.
102. Id. at 40.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Indeed, the only book written about Butler's life thoroughly chronicles his nomination
and confirmation. DANELSKI, supra note 3. David Danelski's excellent book, entitled A Supreme
Court Justice is Appointed, is the basis for much of the discussion in this Part regarding Butler's
nomination and confirmation to the Supreme Court.
105. Id. at 43-45.
106. Id. at 43.
107. Id.
108. Id. Though not Catholic, Davis was viewed as a viable nominee because of his
prominent standing with Democrats. In the view of one of Taft's advisors, Davis was the best
choice because he was from New York, the state that was widely thought to be entitled to the
next Supreme Court appointment. Id.
109. In fact, by the time Davis passed away in 1955, he had argued more cases before the
Supreme Court than any other twentieth-century lawyer; it is believed that only Daniel Webster
and Walter Jones argued more cases before the Court. For a detailed description of Davis's
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in Taft's view because of Davis's preeminent standing with Democrats
in Congress and his excellent "reputation all over the country." 110
However, Davis was not enthusiastic about the position, responding to
Taft's overtures by saying that he would give the idea "prayerful
consideration," but requesting a "breathing spell" in order to make up
his mind.1 11 Uncertain about whether Davis would ultimately accept
the position, Taft began seeking other potential nominees.
The time was short to find Day's replacement; Harding was
under enormous pressure to nominate Judge Martin Manton, who was
a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Taft
viewed Manton as a "shrewd, cunning and political judge" who was
unfit to fill the vacancy. 112 However, Manton fit all the other criteria
for the nomination: he was a Catholic Democrat from New Yorkviewed by many as the next state in line for a Supreme Court
appointment-and was supported by many prominent politicians and
leaders of the Catholic Church, including New York Archbishop
Patrick Hayes, a friend of Harding's.1 13 Taft needed to find a suitable
nominee quickly, if for no other reason than to ensure that Manton
would not receive the nomination.
Taft and his advisers considered and rejected a number of
prominent jurists before finally settling on Butler. Taft closely
considered Learned Hand, who was eliminated because he was viewed
as "a wild Roosevelt man and a progressive" who would "most
certainly herd with Brandeis and be a dissenter."1 14 Benjamin
Cardozo, then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals and later a
Supreme Court Justice, was rejected because of the widespread belief
11 5
at the time that Jews could not outnumber Catholics on the Court.
Even Harlan Fiske Stone, who would later become Chief Justice, was
an unsatisfactory nominee in Taft's view because of concerns about
tenure in the Solicitor General's Office, see PETER N. UBERTACCIO III, LEARNED IN THE LAW AND
POLITICS: THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 73-80 (2005).
110. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 43, 45, 46.

111. Id. at 47, 53.
112. Id. at 45. At the time, Taft viewed Manton as too political because he was closely
associated with Tammany Hall. Id. Taft's reservations regarding Manton turned out to be
prophetic because Manton later resorted to accepting gifts and bribes from litigants having
business before the Second Circuit. He resigned in 1939 after Manhattan District Attorney
Thomas Dewey wrote to the House Judiciary Committee suggesting that Manton be impeached.
Manton was later indicted and became the first federal judge to be convicted of accepting bribes.
JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 25-82 (1962) (noting that Manton was ultimately
sentenced to two years imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000); see also United
States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 850 (2d Cir. 1939) (affirming Manton's conviction).
113. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 45.
114. Id. at 42 (quoting the Taft papers).
115. Id. at 46.
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Stone's temperament and doubts about whether -President Harding
116
would nominate Stone.
While seeking Day's successor, Taft looked to others, including
Justice Van Devanter, for guidance.1 1 7 Van Devanter mentioned
Butler as a possibility, in large part because Butler had appeared
more than one hundred times before the Eighth Circuit.1 18 Based on
Taft's personal knowledge of Butler from the Grand Trunk Railway
arbitration, he quickly agreed that Butler could be a suitable
nominee. 119 Taft found that Butler's friends and colleagues in
Minnesota and elsewhere in the Midwest strongly supported his
nomination.1 20 Judge Sanborn, who had known Butler since his legal
apprenticeship at Pinch & Twohy, stated that Butler was "one of the
few great men of my acquaintance" and that his character was
"beyond reproach." 121 Former Attorney General George Wickersham,
for whom Butler prosecuted the bleached flour and meatpacking cases
in 1910, also viewed Butler as a very able attorney and a worthy
nominee.1 22 With Davis unable to commit to the position and Manton
gaining support among political elites, Taft wrote to Harding and
recommended that Butler be nominated to fill the vacancy created by
the resignation of Justice Day.1 2 3 According to the letter, Taft believed
that Butler "would make a great Justice" because of Butler's "rugged
124
character and force."
Butler's former colleagues also urged Harding to nominate
Butler. John Twohy, Butler's boss thirty-four years earlier, embarked
on a cross-country campaign to urge prominent members of the
Catholic Church and western congressmen to support Butler's
nomination. 12 5 Carmi Thompson, who previously worked for the
railroads and was Harding's preferred Republican candidate for the
126
1922 Ohio gubernatorial election, was also a Butler supporter.
Butler's predecessor as Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas O'Brien,
sent telegrams to Knute Nelson, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary

116. Id. at 48.
117. Id. at 49.
118. Id. at 54 (quoting Taft's letter to President Harding).
119. Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 49.
at 50.
at 54.
at 61.
at 65-66.
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Committee, supporting Butler's nomination. 127 Notably, all five
members of the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that Butler's
nomination would earn the "respect and approval of the entire bench
and bar of Minnesota.' 28
The political timing of the vacancy was fortunate for Butler.
Democrats had just beaten the Republicans handily in the 1922
congressional elections, reducing the Republican majority in the
Senate from sixty to fifty-three. 12 9 Prominent Republicans and
supporters of the Harding Administration, such as Senator Frank
Kellogg of Minnesota and Carmi Thompson of Ohio, were among those
who lost their election contests. 130 Meanwhile, critics of the
Administration, such as Robert LaFollete of Wisconsin and Henrik
Shipstead of Minnesota, were elected to office by resounding
margins. 131 The declining popularity of the Harding Administration
and the Republicans' slim majority in the Senate forced Harding to
seek a nominee who would not provoke a bitter confrontation with
Congress. Pierce Butler was a natural choice; he was strongly favored
by Taft and was both a Democrat and a Catholic, which was just
"what [the Administration] was looking for" in a nominee. 132
Accordingly, on November 22, 1922, Harding sent Butler's nomination
133
to the Senate for consideration.
Harding and Taft misjudged the reaction that Senate
Democrats would have to Butler's nomination. Senators Shipstead and
LaFollete opposed Butler because they believed that he was not
progressive enough.134 Many progressive organizations agreed,
including the Chicago Federation of Labor, the Wisconsin Women's
Progressive Association, and the Working Peoples Political League, to
name just a few. 135 Newspapers such as The Nation and The New York
127. Id. at 66.
128. Id. (quoting the letter from the Minnesota Supreme Court).
129. Id. at 86.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 87.
133. Id. at 88. Justice Van Devanter was so pleased with Butler's nomination that he wrote
to a friend that Butler was "a fine lawyer, a broad-gauged, red-blooded man and in every way
fitted for the [Supreme Court]." Id.
134. See id. at 90 (noting LaFollette's concerns about Butler's railroad advocacy).
135. See Telegram from Burghild Kuhlney, Secretary, Wisconsin Women's Progressive
Association of Superior, to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary
(Dec. 6, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review); Telegram from John Fitzpatrick,
President, Chicago Federation of Labor, to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
of the Judiciary (Dec. 6, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review); Telegram from Frank
Fischer, Chairman, Working People's Political League, to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. of the Judiciary (Nov. 29, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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Times argued against his confirmation. 13 6 Indeed, Butler had
opponents on all sides-even the Ku Klux Klan opposed him. 137 As a
result, Butler's nomination lapsed in the Senate, only to be revived
when Harding renominated him to the Court on December 5, 1922.138
After the renomination, Chairman Knute Nelson ordered a
subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate
Butler's qualifications. 139 Critics had raised two categories of
objections to Butler's appointment: first, that he had acted improperly
in personnel actions against several University of Minnesota
professors while serving on the Board of Regents and second, that
Butler could not preside over railroad cases impartially.140 The
subcommittee investigated those allegations carefully.141
The first objection-that Butler had acted improperly in
personnel decisions involving several professors-arose from his
service as a member of the Board of Regents for the University of
Minnesota. 142 After advising Minnesota Governors John Johnson and
Winfield Hammond on various matters, Butler was appointed in 1907
to a position on the Board of Regents, a post that he occupied until he
was named to the Supreme Court. 143 Butler had earned a reputation
for heavy-handedness as a Regent, even issuing "orders to the
144
university president" regarding personnel decisions.
Senator Shipstead contended in a letter to the subcommittee
that Butler was not "judicial in mind or attitude" because he acted in
an "unfair and unjudicial manner" in personnel decisions carried out
against several University of Minnesota professors. 145 Two
professors-Thomas Schaper and Stanley Rypins-alleged that Butler

136. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 90; Hedges, supra note 60, at 124-26.
137. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 92.
138. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 7.
139. To my knowledge, the transcript of the proceedings of the subcommittee and other
related documents have never been published. All sources related to those proceedings, including
the transcript of the hearings, were obtained from the libraries of the Minnesota Historical
Society and the University of Washington.
140. Letter from Henrik Shipstead, Senator-Elect of Minn., to Knute Nelson, Chairman,
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary (Dec. 7, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) (noting four main concerns with Butler's nomination).
141. See The Nomination of Pierce Butler, of Minnesota, to Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary(Dec. 8, 1922) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (on file with the author).
142. Letter from Henrik Shipstead, Senator-Elect of Minn., to Knute Nelson, Chairman,
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary (Dec. 7, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law

Review).
143. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 14-15.

144. Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 141, at 58.
145. Letter from Henrik Shipstead, supra note 140.
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played an instrumental role in terminating them based on their
outspoken liberal views. 146 Schaper, in particular, testified that Butler
was unfit to serve on the Supreme Court because he was an
"aggressive and overbearing bully" who behaved inappropriately by
acting as the "judge, prosecutor, and executioner" with respect to his
dismissal. 147 In short, Schaper argued that Butler lacked an
148
appropriate judicial temperament.
A more serious allegation originated from John Gray, a
professor in the economics department who had adjudicated railroad
valuation cases on behalf of the ICC.149 Gray complained that Butler
retaliated against him after Gray reached an unfavorable decision
15 0
against the Texas Midland Railroad, Butler's client at the time.
Gray alleged that Butler was so enraged at the decision that he
"lodged personal and private complaints" against him with the ICC.151
Gray further accused Butler of retaliating against him by playing an
instrumental role in denying Gray a promotion to the school of
business when it opened in 1920.152 Butler realized the seriousness of
Gray's allegations; if the subcommittee believed them to be true, it
would show that he acted improperly and unprofessionally.153
Butler and his allies disputed the allegations made by the
professors. Butler defended Schaper's dismissal by writing that "[h]is
removal [was] in harmony with the ...tendency to silence disloyal
communities, institutions, publications, officials, and individuals. We
must see that sincere, loyal Americans are made the instructors of our
youth, and not 'blatherskites,' such as this man." 154 Butler's son,
Pierce, Jr., wrote a letter to Chairman Nelson, who was a member of
the subcommittee that heard testimony on Butler's nomination,
155
further disputing the charges made by the University professors.
146. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 21 (noting Shipstead's argument that
Butler "let his bias and his prejudice" against Schaper and Rypins "rule his reason").
147. Id. at 59.
148. Butler was also allegedly involved in the termination of Gerhard Dietrichson, a
professor in the Department of Chemistry. Dietrichson accused Butler of suppressing a report
that confirmed Dietrichson's allegations of irregularities and difficulties in the school of
chemistry, amounting to maladministration and waste of public funds. Dietrichson argued that
he should have been reinstated once the report was made available to the Board of Regents.
DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 95-97.
149. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 79.
150. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 98-99.
151. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 81.
152. Id. at 80.
153. Letter from Pierce Butler to William Howard Taft, supra note 99.
154. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 66.
155. Letter from Pierce Butler, Jr., to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
of the Judiciary (Dec. 7, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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William Mitchell, Butler's law partner, sent a telegram to the
subcommittee contesting Rypins's allegations in particular. 156 The
thrust of the letters was clear: Butler was subject to unjustified
attacks by dissatisfied and disloyal individuals who were not being
157
honest.
The subcommittee ultimately found that there was insufficient
evidence to support allegations of inappropriate involvement in any of
the personnel decisions and that, in any event, the claims were beyond
the scope of their inquiry. 158 As Senator Albert Cummins stated
succinctly, the subcommittee's purpose was not "to review the action of
the board of Regents. That is perfectly ridiculous." 159 The
subcommittee also dismissed the one charge that posed a real threat
to Butler's prospects for confirmation-the allegation that Butler
sought revenge against Gray for his unfavorable decision in the
railroad valuation case-as unsupported by the evidence. No member
of the ICC had any recollection of complaints filed by Butler against
Gray.1 60 In sum, the subcommittee concluded that it "would be absurd
to claim that Butler would not be a decent Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court" simply because of his actions as a Regent, regardless
1 61
of the wisdom of the Board's actions in dealing with the professors.
The other chief objection to Butler's nomination resulted from
his longstanding representation of railroads in private practice.
Senator Shipstead argued that Butler was "completely imbued with
the viewpoint of these corporations, and so blind to the public interest,
that he would be unable as a member of the Supreme Court to act
with an unbiased mind, but would in his decisions necessarily and
inevitably be influenced by his past interests and associations." 162 In
Shipstead's view, the allegations raised two potential problems for
Butler: first, that Butler would be biased toward the railroads in
pending litigation before the Court and second, that Butler would be
required to recuse himself from hearing all railroad cases, a
substantial portion of the Court's docket at the time.1 6 3 The
subcommittee was unmoved by Shipstead's objections, in large part

156. Telegram from William D. Mitchell, to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. of the Judiciary (Nov. 29, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
157. E.g., id.
158. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 70.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 83.
161. Id. at 78.
162. Letter from Henrik Shipstead to Knute Nelson, supra note 140.
163. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 141, at 8-13 (discussing the issue of Butler
being a "partisan advocate" on behalf of corporations); id. at 96 (addressing the recusal problem).
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because it was unable to find that Butler had done anything improper
in his representation of the railroads 164 and that it would be hard to
find a qualified nominee "of any prominence who would not be
disqualified" in some of the cases before the Court. 16 5 Besides, as
Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana noted, Butler would only
potentially be disqualified in cases involving railroad valuation.166 The
subcommittee also looked into various other allegations of wrongdoing
by Butler, but the remaining objections were found to be meritless.167
The outpouring of support from a number of important
constituencies, including members of the academy and prominent
politicians, helped Butler overcome the objections made by his critics.
College and university presidents such as Donald Cowling of Carleton
College, L.D. Coffman of the University of Minnesota, and M.L.
Burton of the University of Michigan, all supported Butler's
nomination. 68 President Coffman, for instance, described Butler as
"without a peer among the legal fraternity," whose selection "would
reflect a large measure of distinction upon the office."'169 Burton
characterized Butler as having one of the "keenest analytical minds,"
making him an "eminently worthy nominee."' 70 Two former Minnesota
governors, J.A. Burnquist and J.A.O. Preus, also lined up to support
Butler's nomination. 171 Even Felix Frankfurter, the well-known
Harvard Law professor and future Supreme Court Justice, could not
find a reason to object to Butler's appointment. 72

164. Id. at 95.
165. Id. at 90.
166. Id. It appears that the reservations expressed by Butler's critics in this regard were
valid because Butler later participated in a case involving his former client, the Great Northern
Railway. See infra note 335.
167. For instance, Shipstead was upset by Butler's representation of the Twin City Rapid
Transit Company, which was accused of using "corrupt and improper" methods to secure the
approval of the company's projects. Butler apparently fought to keep the city from examining the
company's accounting records. The Committee quickly dismissed the charge, finding that Butler
zealously advocated for his client, an obligation of every competent attorney. Subcommittee
Hearings,supra note 141, at 93; Letter from Henrik Shipstead to Knute Nelson, supra note 140.
168. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 71-72, 116.
169. Telegram from Lotus D. Coffman, President, Univ. of Minn., to Knute Nelson,
Chairman, Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 28, 1922) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
170. Telegram from M.L. Burton, President, Univ. of Mich., to Knute Nelson, Chairman,
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 28, 1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
171. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 116.

172. Id. at 127. In fact, Frankfurter wrote to Butler's son prior to the Senate subcommittee
hearings to stress that the allegations made by Senator Shipstead that Frankfurter opposed
Butler's appointment were false:
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Accordingly, on December 21, 1922, the U.S. Senate confirmed
Butler by a vote of 61-8, with only a few progressive Democrats voting
against his appointment. 173 Less than two weeks later, Butler took the
oath of office and became the seventy-first Justice to sit on the
1 74
Supreme Court of the United States.
IV. BUTLER'S JURISPRUDENCE
His philosophy was that of laissez faire, and he expressed it in its simplest forms. He
was concerned for the rights of the criminal; he had no feeling for the rights of the
radical dissenter. Nor will the reading of his opinions yield an easy understanding of the
175
ambiguities in his thought.

As a Supreme Court Justice, Butler's jurisprudence was
deceptively nuanced. Those who categorize him merely as one of the
so-called "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse"1 76 fail to give him credit
for the intricacy and sophistication with which he approached
constitutional questions. To be sure, Butler often took positions that
were "favorable toward constitutional protection of economic liberties
through judicial restriction of government action."'177 But it is far too
simplistic to assert, as some commentators have, that Butler was the
"epitome of ultra-conservativism"' 7 8 or that he was "insensitive to
matters of civil liberties.' ' 79 To the extent that labels are helpful in
describing
Butler,
previous
commentators
have
largely
mischaracterized his jurisprudence by widely labeling him as a
"conservative."'' 8 0
For
example,
Butler
took stereotypically
Therefore, I should like you, and your father, to know, that it's all rubbishmade out of whole cloth. That I am to appear as a witness, or that I am in
any wise [sic] involved, directly or indirectly, in the opposition [to your
father's nomination], is as true as that I am a son-in-law of Mr. Justice
Brandeis-in other words, it's utterly baseless in fact.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor of Law, Harvard Univ., to Pierce Butler, Jr. (Dec. 9,
1922) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
173. Burner, supra note 16, at 1085.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1090.
176. E.g., FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM
1790 TO 1955, at 217 (1955) (naming Butler as one of the "Four Horsemen of Reaction").
177. EDWARD NEWTON KEARNEY, FOUR ECONOMIC CONSERVATIVES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A
STUDY OF THE POSITIONS OF JUSTICES BUTLER, MCREYNOLDS, SUTHERLAND AND VAN DEVANTER,
WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PERIOD 1923-1937, at 6 (1965).
178. Robert W. Langran, Why Are Some Supreme Court Justices Rated As "Failures"?,1985
Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOCY 9, 10.
179. Id. at 11.
180. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided" Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism,85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 685 (2005) (characterizing Butler as a member of a "four person
conservative bloc" that opposed many of President Roosevelt's New Deal programs); Samuel R.
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libertarian18 1 (or even liberal) positions in cases involving the Fourth
Amendment and the rights of criminal defendants.18 2 Moreover, even
in Fourteenth Amendment cases, where much of his economic liberties
jurisprudence is grounded, Butler's opinions are difficult to categorize
consistently as conservative or liberal.18 3 Accordingly, previous

Olken, The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty, Political Factionsand the Forgotten First
Amendment Legacy of Justice George Sutherland, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 249, 252 n.12
(2002) (same); William G. Ross, When Did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?: Re-Discovering
the Supreme Court's "Forgotten"Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1159 (2005)
(characterizing Butler as a "deeply conservative" member of the Supreme Court in the 1930s).
As this Article explains, I do not think it is particularly helpful to refer to Butler as a
"conservative" because his views are much more nuanced than that simple label conveys.
Instead, I use that term in this Article not so much to describe Butler's jurisprudence, but to
refer to the four Justice voting bloc that many historians label as the "Four Horseman"-which
includes Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter.
181. For purposes of this Article, I use Jan Narveson's definition of the term
"libertarianism":
the doctrine that the only relevant consideration in political matters is
individual liberty: that there is a delimitable sphere of action for each person,
the person's "rightful liberty," such that one may be forced to do or refrain
from what one wants to do only if what one would do or not do would violate,
or at least infringe, the rightful liberty of some other person(s).
JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 7 (2001); see also DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A
PRIMER 2 (1997):

Libertarians defend each person's right to life, liberty, and property-rights
that people possess naturally, before governments are created. In the
libertarian view, all human relationships should be voluntary; the only
actions that should be forbidden by law are those that involve the initiation of
force against those who have not themselves used force-actions like murder,
rape, robbery, kidnapping, and fraud.
Posner, Economic Document, supra note 23, at 21:
[T]he economic libertarian approach (whether it takes the form of
reinterpretation of the existing Constitution, amendment, or both) diminishes
the role of democracy-potentially dramatically. The approach does not entail
merely a redirection of constitutional protection from so-called personal
liberties to economic liberties, for the consistent libertarian believes as
strongly in the former as in the latter. To him the "marketplace in ideas" is a
reality and not a metaphor, and sexual freedom, provided it does not cause
harm to third parties, is as worthy of constitutional protection as freedom to
choose an occupation or decide how much rent to charge a tenant. What is
envisaged therefore is a drastic curtailment, across the board, in the scope of
permissible legislative, executive, and administrative action.
See generally LEONARD

E. READ, ELEMENTS

OF LIBERTARIAN LEADERSHIP

13-183

(1962)

(chronicling the basic tenets of libertarianism in America).
182. See infra notes 194-222 and accompanying text.
183. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Butler, J., dissenting without opinion
from the Supreme Court's holding that a compulsory sterilization statute as applied to the
feeble-minded was constitutional, a position considered liberal in retrospect), with McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408 (holding that utility rates set by the Indianapolis
Water Company were too high and therefore confiscatory under Justice Butler's cost of
reproduction analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, a position considered conservative).
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commentators have underestimated the complexity of Butler's
jurisprudence.
Some of the confusion is no doubt a result of the fact that
Butler did not write many of the famous opinions of the period.1 8 4 In
fact, of the more than 300 opinions that Butler authored while serving
on the Court, many were written in highly technical areas, such as in
the fields of public utilities regulation and taxation. 18 5 To date, no
scholar has systematically analyzed these areas of Butler's
jurisprudence. As a result, Butler remains one of the lesser-known
Supreme Court Justices in history, poorly understood and deeply
underanalyzed, despite the fact that he served on the Supreme Court
18 6
for nearly seventeen years.
After briefly reassessing Justice Butler's constitutional
jurisprudence, this Part argues that two reasons explain Justice
Butler's lack of treatment in the scholarly literature. First, as a
matter of style and philosophy, Justice Butler was a deeply private
man and employed a minimalist approach to crafting judicial opinions,
even in high-profile cases. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
Butler's main areas of legal expertise-public utilities regulation and
taxation-are not areas of high salience in the legal community, at
least among those scholars that write about the Supreme Court.
A. A ConstitutionalReassessment
Despite the relative paucity of opinions from Butler concerning
civil liberties, scholars have remained intently focused on how he and
his ideological allies approached cases involving the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 7 In so doing, they note
that, like his fellow conservatives, Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Sutherland, Butler was often hostile to claims
involving civil liberties.1 88 In First Amendment cases, for example,

184. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (opinion by Justice Roberts); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (opinion by Justice McReynolds); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (opinion by Justice Sutherland).
185. See infra notes 306-428 and accompanying text.
186. Even in Butler's life, he remained largely "unknown to the public," and his contribution
to American constitutional law is described as "minimal." BINDLER, supra note 2, at 204.
However, Butler is not the only lesser-known Justice to serve for such a lengthy period: James
M. Wayne (thirty-two years), Samuel Nelson (twenty-seven years), and Robert Grier (twenty-four
years) all served on the Court for decades while remaining relatively unknown. JEFFREY TOOBIN,
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 28 (2007).

187. E.g., HOWELL, supra note 47; KEARNEY, supra note 177; see also Cushman, supra note
71, at 572-80 (discussing the approach of the "Four Horsemen" to constitutional questions).
188. E.g., KEARNEY, supra note 177, at 6.
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Butler often took a characteristically conservative approach, deferring
to state governments as the most appropriate bodies to tend to the
welfare and needs of citizens and permitting extensive regulation of
speech.18 9 When cases involved economic rights, however, Butler
generally subscribed to Lochner and its progeny to invalidate state
legislation that impaired the freedom of contract or property rights.1 90
However, Butler also joined in opinions that were the precursors to
modern substantive due process cases dealing with personal liberty
and autonomy. 191
Nonetheless, an underlying and consistent theme runs through
Butler's jurisprudence: Butler strongly believed in protecting private
property rights, a value that often influenced his votes and opinions in
constitutional cases. Nowhere is that belief more apparent than in his
strict adherence to Lochner in Fourteenth Amendment cases involving
economic and property rights. 192 Butler's elevated view of property
rights
also
seemingly
influenced his
Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-an area in which he often disagreed with Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland.
Even in cases not directly involving property rights, however,
Justice Butler often sided with criminal defendants against the
government, demonstrating the anti-government tendencies that were
an outgrowth of his education, upbringing, and prior experience as a
prosecutor. 9 3 Therefore, it is too simplistic and inaccurate to label
189. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723-38 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) ("It is
of the greatest importance that the States shall be untrammeled and free to employ all just and
appropriate measures to prevent abuses of the liberty of the press.").
190. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (finding state
legislation fixing wages for women "repugnant" to the Fourteenth Amendment).
191. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating legislation that
unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of their children); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923):
Without doubt, [the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
192. See, e.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1926) ("But a state may
not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or
prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.").
193. As his son Francis would later explain, Butler's experience as a prosecutor made him
especially committed to giving criminal defendants all of the. procedural rights that they were
entitled under the Constitution. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. As Ramsey
County Attorney, Butler was exposed to the types of abuses that can occur when prosecutors and
the police elevate the need to win above all else. Id. As a result, Butler was a "stickler" in
criminal cases. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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Butler as a monolithic conservative, as many commentators have
done, because Butler adopted pro-defendant positions in a number of
cases involving the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
1. The Rights of Criminal Defendants
Aside from his laissez-faire and pro-property jurisprudence on
economic rights, Butler's libertarian leanings are most apparent in his
Fourth Amendment opinions. It was not uncommon for Butler to take
a position contrary to his conservative colleagues when addressing
cases involving the right of "the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures" 194 and in giving robust construction to the warrant
195
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Perhaps the most famous example of Justice Butler's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,196 in which the Court held, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft,
that evidence obtained under a wiretap did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 197 The majority opinion, joined by Butler's conservative
colleagues McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, adopted a
literal construction of the Fourth Amendment, holding that the
wiretap was not a search because the text of the Fourth Amendment is
limited to searches of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 198
In dissent, Justice Butler rejected the narrow interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment adopted by the Court and instead would have
broadly construed the types of property in which a criminal defendant
has a Fourth Amendment interest: "The direct operation or literal
meaning of the words used [in the Fourth Amendment] do not
measure the purpose or scope of its provisions."1 99 According to Butler:
Telephones are used generally for transmission of messages concerning official, social,
business and personal affairs including communications that are private and
privileged-those between physician and patient, lawyer and client, parent and child,
husband and wife. The contracts between telephone companies and users contemplate

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
277 U.S. 438, 486-88 (1928).
Id. at 465.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). The Court reasoned:
The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or
office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than
are the highways along which they are stretched.

Id.
199. Id. at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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the private use of the facilities employed in the service. The communications belong to
the parties between whom they pass. During their transmission the exclusive use of the
wire belongs to the persons served by it. Wire tapping involves interference with the
wire while being used. Tapping the
wires and listening in by the officers literally
200
constituted a search for evidence.

Butler would have therefore held in Olmstead that the wiretap
constituted a search and that the federal prohibition officers violated
the Fourth Amendment because they did not secure a search warrant
prior to conducting the wiretap. 20 1 Although Butler did not join the
other dissents in the case, written by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
Butler's dissent was surprisingly similar in tone and substance to
those other dissents because each would have given broad
construction to the text of the Fourth Amendment. 20 2 Nearly forty
years later in Katz v. United States,20 3 the Court vindicated the views
expressed by Justices Butler, Holmes, and Brandeis by overruling
Olmstead expressly and holding that a wiretap constituted a search
20 4
under the Fourth Amendment.
In several of the other Fourth Amendment decisions of the
period, Justice Butler sided with criminal defendants. In Agnello v.
United States,20 5 for example, Justice Butler wrote the opinion for the
Court holding that a warrantless search of the residence of a drug
conspirator several blocks away from the location of his arrest could
not be sustained as a valid search incident to arrest.20 6 The Court's
holding was based in part on the sanctity of the home: "[T]he
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all equally-to those
just suspected or accused, as well as to the innocent. The search of a
private dwelling without a warrant is itself unreasonable and
abhorrent to our laws. ' 20 7 Such searches, he stated, were unlawful

200. Id. at 487.
201. Id. at 488.
202. Compare id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting) (employing a broad construction of the
Fourth Amendment), with id. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Amendment
should be construed "in light of its object"), and id. at 484 (suggesting that the government
should not foster crime by using tainted evidence in criminal trials).
203. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
204. Id. at 359. In a 1937 decision, the Court held that federal agents were not authorized by
the Federal Communication Act of 1934 to intercept telephonic communications through a
wiretap. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). That case, however, did not involve
the question addressed in Olmstead-whether a wiretap is a search under the Fourth
Amendment.
205. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
206. Id. at 31.
207. Id. at 32. Justice Butler further noted that "Congress ha[d] never passed an act
purporting to authorize the search of a house without a warrant. On the other hand, special
limitations have been set about the obtaining of search warrants for that purpose." Id.
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"notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause." 208
20 9
Similarly, again writing for the Court in United States v. Lefkowit,
Justice Butler struck down an exploratory search conducted by
prohibition officers without a warrant because the officers arrested the
conspirator merely as a pretext to search for evidence. 210 In a number
of other cases, Justice Butler joined opinions of the Court invalidating
2 11
searches under the Fourth Amendment.
In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Butler was a
"stickler for the rights of criminals."2 12 That strand of his
jurisprudence extended beyond the Fourth Amendment and included a
broad understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in
criminal cases. 2 13 In District of Columbia v. Clawans,21 4 Butler alone
joined a dissent authored by Justice McReynolds that would have
required a jury trial for the offense of engaging, without a license, in
the sale of secondhand goods, which carried a penalty of ninety days in
jail or a fine of $300 in the District of Columbia. 2 15 In contrast, the
majority opinion found no constitutional violation when the
government denied the defendant a jury trial because he would not
have been afforded one "when the Constitution was adopted." 2 16 In an
earlier case, Butler also joined a unanimous Court in holding that the
Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial for the crime of reckless
driving while exceeding the speed limit, which carried a sentence of
between ten and thirty days in jail under a District of Columbia8
21
ordinance. 217 Finally, in Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Butler joined Justices Roberts, Sutherland, and Brandeis in a dissent
arguing that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the
208. Id. at 33.
209. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
210. Id. at 467.
211. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 44 (1933) (finding a search warrant
deficient because it rested upon mere suspicion without supporting facts); Sgro v. United States,
287 U.S. 206, 212 (1932) (voiding a search warrant because it had not been executed within ten
days as required by law); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932) (invalidating a search
warrant for lack of probable cause); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927) (holding
that evidence wrongfully procured without a search warrant was inadmissible); Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 23, 28-34 (1927) (invalidating a search warrant issued upon affiant's statement
that he had "good reason" to believe that defendant possessed certain illegal items).
212. Burner, supra note 16, at 1087.
213. E.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1930); see also District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633 (1937).
214. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
215. Id. at 633 (McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
216. Id. at 627.
217. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73-74.
218. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be present when
21 9
the jury visits the scene of an alleged crime.
In numerous cases Butler adopted a position-often contrary to
his conservative allies-broadly construing constitutional provisions
protecting criminal defendants. 220 Butler's son Francis later explained
that his father's support for the rights of criminal defendants arose
from his previous experience as a prosecutor:
[Butler's] early experience was as Assistant County Attorney and then for four years as
County Attorney while he was still under the age of thirty-two. This together with other
matters imbued him with the definite thought that those arrested of crimes should be
given all of the safeguards. He knew the advantage that could be taken by police or
prosecutors who fought to win cases rather than to win them with due regard to the
rights of individuals. Thus the long line of dissents or participation in majority opinions
which protected the accused. In view of his early life as a vigorous prosecutor it is an
and also of his compassion and warmth for
example of devotion to individual liberty
221
individual people of all walks of life.

Commentators, however, sometimes cite the famous Scottsboro
boys case, Powell v. Alabama,222 as proof that Justice Butler was
insensitive to the civil liberties of criminal defendants, particularly
when a case involved black defendants. 223 As an initial matter, that
proposition is dubious because a number of the opinions he joined
favoring the rights of the criminally accused, including Brown v.
Mississippi and Moore v. Dempsey, involved black defendants. 224 But
more fundamentally, Justice Butler dissented from the Court's opinion
on the basis of the record in Powell, not because he viewed the right to
counsel as non-fundamental or objected to the incorporation of the
219. Id. at 134-35.
220. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937) (Butler, J., dissenting without
opinion from the Court's holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the retrial of a
criminal defendant for first-degree murder after the first jury found him guilty of second-degree
murder in a trial replete with legal errors prejudicing the State of Connecticut); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (Butler, J., joining a unanimous Court in holding that use
of a confession obtained by coercion, brutality, and violence could not be a basis for a conviction
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86,
91-92 (1923) (Butler, J., joining an opinion, over the dissent of Justices McReynolds and
Sutherland, holding that a district court should have held a hearing on a motion for a writ of
habeas corpus when the state trial appeared to be a sham and the defendants were convicted
under the pressure of a mob).
221. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3.
222. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
223. See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 47, at 36 (arguing that Butler was a "stubborn bigot," who
was "callous to human needs and well-being'). Although I do not believe that Butler was a bigot
or racist based on my review of his entire voting record, the possibility cannot be completely
dismissed in light of his votes in the Scottsboro Boys case as well as in other cases involving the
constitutional rights of minorities and aliens under the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes
249-264 and accompanying text.
224. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281; Moore, 261 U.S. at 87.
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right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment. 225 In fact, in the
opening sentence of the dissent, Butler stated that if it were true that
defendants were "denied the right of counsel," they would be entitled
to the reversal of their convictions. 226 In his view, however,
defendants' counsel performed "a rigorous and rigid crossexamination" of the state's witnesses and submitted a motion for a
change of venue together with supporting papers, both of which
indicated to Butler that the defendants were not denied the effective
assistance of counsel. 227 Though it might be easy to argue against
Butler's view of the record in the case, there is not any language in the
opinion suggesting that it represents a broader insensitivity to the
civil liberties of criminal defendants. To the contrary, a review of
Butler's entire record in criminal cases suggests that he often sided
with criminal defendants over the state or federal governments, far
more often than did his ideological allies Justices McReynolds,
228
Sutherland, and Van Devanter.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
One of the most important jurisprudential developments of the
early twentieth century was the Supreme Court's success in striking
down a number of state laws regulating property and contractual
rights as inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. In a line of
cases that is now harshly criticized, the Court invalidated laws
regulating economic rights, beginning with the case of Lochner v. New
York, 2 29 in which the Court struck down a New York law limiting the
number of hours that bakers could work each week. 230 In the decades

225. Powell, 287 U.S. at 74-76 (Butler, J., dissenting). On the incorporation issue, Butler
would have refused to address it as a procedural matter because it was not properly raised in the
courts below or before the Supreme Court. Id. at 76.
226. Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 75.
228. See, e.g., Burner, supra note 16, at 1090 ("[Butler] was concerned for the rights of the
criminal."). It is important to note, however, that when the rights of aliens were at issue, Butler
almost always sided with the United States government. See, e.g., Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S.
22, 38 (1937) (Butler, J., concurring in Justice McReynolds's dissenting opinion arguing that an
alien should have been deported because of his association with socialist organizations); United
States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636, 637 (1931) (Butler, J., joining Justice Sutherland's majority
opinion denying an alien's citizenship petition because she would only take the required oath by
adding qualifying language); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931) (same);
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 652 (1929) (Butler, J., holding for a six-justice
majority that Rosika Schwimmer was properly denied her citizenship application because she
refused to take up arms even in cases of national necessity).
229. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
230. Id. at 64.
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that followed Lochner, the Court continued to take a narrow view of
23 1
state police powers and a broad view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These decisions were so controversial that in 1937 they provoked a
strong response from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who
threatened to pack the Court with additional members to ensure the
survival of his New Deal programs. 232 Roosevelt's Court-packing plan
failed, ostensibly because Justice Owen Roberts abruptly switched his
vote in economic liberties cases beginning in West Coast Hotel v.
233 The press
Parrish.
labeled that dramatic turn of events as the
"switch in time that saved the nine."234 Among the Court's strongest
adherents to Lochner, however, was Justice Butler, who authored
many of the important Fourteenth Amendment opinions of the period.
In just his first full Term on the Supreme Court, it quickly
became clear that Justice Butler's pro-property and libertarian
leanings would, like his views on the Fourth Amendment, also
dominate his economic liberties jurisprudence. In Jay Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan,23 5 Justice Butler wrote the majority opinion invalidating
a Nebraska statute that required loaves of bread to be sold in strict
weight increments. 236 The Nebraska statute was designed to prevent
bread manufacturers from defrauding the public by selling bread
below the weight specified, but Justice Butler wrote that the statute's
requirements were too stringent and thus subjected "bakers and
sellers of bread to restrictions which [were] essentially unreasonable
231. See Olken, supra note 180, at 278 (describing Lochner and the cases that followed as
employing "a relatively narrow, categorical conception of local police powers"); William M.
Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure,26 REV. LITIG. 641, 687 (2007) (stating
that "[tihe death of Lochner liberated the states' police powers").
232. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94-95 (16th ed.
2007); Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2170 (1999).
233. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Hughes); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
333 (1998); Kalman, supra note 232, at 2172. But see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 4-5 (1998) (criticizing the
standard story of the "switch in time that saved the nine").
234. William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 593-94 (2004).
Some authorities question the conventional view that Roberts's vote was cast in Parrishafter
Roosevelt's announcement of his plan to pack the Supreme Court. Under the alternative view, it
was primarily the resignation of Justice Willis Van Devanter a month after Parrishwas decided
that led to the eventual defeat of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See Barry Friedman, The
History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971,
1028-30, 1053-56 (2000) (discussing the differing historical accounts of the demise of the Courtpacking plan, and noting that Justice Van Devanter's resignation was well-timed to thwart the
proposal); Stephen 0. Kline, Revisiting FDR's Court Packing Plan: Are the Current Attacks on
Judicial Independence So Bad?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 863, 942 (1999) (explaining how Justice
Van Devanter resigned strategically in order to "help defeat FDR's plan").
235. 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
236. Id. at 517.
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and arbitrary. ' 237 Nearly two years later, in Weaver v. Palmer Bros.,
Justice Butler again wrote for the Court in striking down a
238
Pennsylvania law that completely prohibited the use of "shoddy"
and certain secondhand materials in mattress production. 23 9 The
Court found that the prohibition on the use of shoddy was "purely
arbitrary" 240 and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
the State of Pennsylvania had failed to present evidence of "danger to
241
the health of users of comfortables filled with shoddy."
Throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court, Butler
consistently supported the Court's post-Lochner invalidation of state
laws that interfered with private property rights, the right to contract,
and other economic rights. He largely developed his reputation as one
of the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" by consistently voting with
Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter in economic
rights cases. 242 In fact, Butler is responsible for authoring what
became Lochner's last major gasp in Morehead v. New York ex. rel.
Tipaldo,243 in which a closely divided Court struck down New York's
minimum wage law as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 The
case concerned whether the State of New York could, consistent with
the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, impose "minimum wage rates for all competent
experienced women workers." 245 In answering that question in the
negative, Butler invoked the fundamental right to contract recognized
in Lochner and its progeny:
The right to make contracts about one's affairs is a part of the liberty protected by the
due process clause. Within this liberty are provisions of contracts between employer and

237. Id. In a decision involving a similar Nebraska statute ten years later, Justice Butler
again wrote for the Court but upheld the amended statute. P.F. Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan,
290 U.S. 570, 575 (1934). According to Justice Butler, the amended statute was far more flexible
than the statute considered in Jay Burns because it involved three rather than two ounce
allowances for bread weight and required the minimum weight to be maintained for just twelve
instead of twenty-four hours after baking. Id. at 573 (noting that, under the Jay Burns statute,
"it was impossible to make good bread in the regular way without exceeding the tolerances then
prescribed"). Accordingly, the Court held in P.F.Peterson that the amended Nebraska statute did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 575.
238. Under the Pennsylvania statute, "shoddy" was defined as "any material which has been
spun into yarn, knit or woven into fabric, and subsequently cut up, torn up, broken up, or ground
up." Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 409 (1926).
239. Id. at 415.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 412.
242. E.g., id.
243. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
244. Id. at 618.
245. Id. at 610.
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employee fixing the wages to be paid. In making contracts of employment, generally
speaking, the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can
by private bargaining. Legislative abridgement of that freedom can only be justified by
the existence of exceptional circumstances. Freedom of contract is the general rule and
246
restraint the exception.

In recognizing the liberty to contract, Justice Butler also rejected the
policies underlying the New York law and further elucidated his own
laissez-faire leanings, stating that the "prescribing of minimum wages
for women alone would unreasonably restrain them in competition
with men and tend arbitrarily to deprive them of employment and a
fair chance to find work. ' 247 The Court ultimately held in Morehead
that New York's minimum wage law violated the Fourteenth
Amendment for the same reasons as a materially indistinguishable
federal law that was previously invalidated by the Court in Adkins v.
248
Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia.
Lochner and the other economic liberties cases were
emblematic of Justice Butler's view that private property rights
deserved robust constitutional protection. However, in Butler's view,
even the protection of property rights, a core tenet of his judicial
philosophy, had its limits. In a series of cases in 1923, better known as
the "Alien Land Law Cases," Butler deferred to state and federal
governments in the regulation of matters relating to property
ownership by resident aliens. He authored a series of four opinions for
the Court, each of which raised the question of whether states could,
consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
249
Fourteenth Amendment, limit land ownership by Japanese aliens.
The Washington and California statutes at issue prevented Japanese
aliens from leasing agricultural land, 250 becoming stockholders in a
corporation authorized to hold land, 251 and making cropping contracts
with respect to agricultural land. 2 52 Despite the obvious restraint on
property and contract rights for both the landowner and the resident
alien in each of the four cases, 253 Justice Butler wrote for five other
Justices in upholding each measure as consistent with "those powers

246. Id. at 610-11.
247. Id. at 616.
248. Id. at 618.
249. Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 335 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 318 (1923);
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 231 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 211 (1923).
250. Porterfield,263 U.S. at 232; Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220.
251. Frick, 263 U.S. at 333.
252. O'Brien, 263 U.S. at 319 n.1.
253. See, e.g., Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 232-33 (observing that the California Alien Land Law
"forbids [Japanese aliens] to lease land in the State" and "deprives Porterfield of the right to
enter into contracts for the leasing of his realty").
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of police that were reserved [to each state] at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution. 254 Though the Court recognized that resident
aliens are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Butler
nonetheless wrote for the Court that "[s]tate legislation applying alike
and equally to all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land,
cannot be said to be capricious or to amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or property, or to transgress the due process
clause." 255 The Court thus concluded that such laws were not arbitrary
because resident aliens possessed "rights, privileges and duties" that
"differ[ed] widely" from citizens, 256 and the classification system in the
state statutes was presumed to be "substantial and reasonable"
because it was based upon the federal naturalization laws. 257 Thus, in
the "Alien Land Law Cases," Butler drew a firm distinction between
the right of resident aliens to work for a living and their right to
possess an ownership interest in land, the latter of which was not
258
constitutionally protected.
Similarly, in a case addressing the right of racial minorities to
get an education, Justice Butler dissented from an opinion of the
Court that struck down a Missouri statute that permitted the
University of Missouri School of Law to deny equal admission to black

254. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 217. In Terrace, Justice Butler recognized the broad regulatory
authority of the state in regulating the health and welfare of its citizens: "And in the exercise of
such powers the state has wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what
measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good
order of its people." Id.
255. Id. at 218.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 220.
258. One explanation for the seeming inconsistency between his staunch protection of
private property rights in other contexts and his approval of the highly restrictive limitations on

property rights in the "Alien Land Law Cases" is that the latter involved a conflict between two
core pillars of his philosophy: his deep and abiding sense of national patriotism, DANELSKI, supra
note 3, at 15, and his opposition to restrictions on private property. Indeed, Butler was rarely
sympathetic (and perhaps even hostile) to the claims of aliens in naturalization and deportation
cases. See, e.g., Kessler v. Stricker, 307 U.S. 22, 35-38 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting from the
majority's holding that a federal statute authorizing the deportation of aliens who belonged to
certain proscribed organizations did not apply to an individual who joined the Communist Party
but then later failed to pay his membership dues); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 613,
626 (1931) (denying citizenship to a Canadian professor who stated that he would only take up
arms for the United States if he believed a war was morally justified); United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 647, 653 (1929) (upholding a lower court decision denying
naturalization to a woman who stated that she would refuse to take up arms even in cases of
national necessity). One passage in Schwimmer aptly summarizes Justice Butler's views on
national loyalty and patriotism: "[One who is without any sense of nationalism is not well bound
or held by the ties of affection to any nation or government. Such persons ... are incapable of the
attachment for and devotion to principles of the Constitution ....Id. at 652.
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students by providing a legal education elsewhere. 259 The State of
Missouri argued that it was fulfilling the "separate but equal"
requirement of Plessy v. Ferguson260 by paying the tuition and fees for
such students to attend a law school in a neighboring state. 261 The
Court rejected that argument in a 7-2 opinion, holding that it would be
impossible to conclude that "what otherwise would be an
unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to the
enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified by
requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere." 262 Justice McReynolds, in
a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Butler, argued that the Court
should have accorded broad deference to the decision of the State of
Missouri to provide black students with a free legal education in a law
school of a neighboring state. 263 By providing such an opportunity,
McReynolds wrote, the state did not show an "unmistakable
disregard" for the prospective student's rights, and it acted in a
manner that "satisf[ied] any reasonable demand for specialized
26 4
training."
Despite Butler's broad deference to states in regulating the
welfare of racial minorities and resident aliens, Justice Butler joined
opinions of the Court containing broad language that arguably formed
the foundation for the substantive due process cases of the latter half
of the twentieth century. In Meyer v. Nebraska, for instance, Butler
joined in an opinion written by Justice McReynolds that recognized:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring .up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
265
happiness by free men.

The Court further stated that, in language echoed in many of the later
privacy cases, "the individual has certain fundamental rights which
267
must be respected. '266 Likewise, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,

259. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 353-54 (1938) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
260. 163 U.S. 537, 540, 548 (1896).
261. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 344.
262. Id. at 350.
263. Id. at 353-54 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice McReynolds's dissent quoted
language from prior opinions of the Court to the effect that "[tihe right and power of the state to
regulate the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense is clear." Id. at
353 (quoting Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927)).
264. Id. at 353-54.
265. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
266. Id. at 401.
267. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Justice Butler joined an opinion of the Court invalidating an Oregon
law requiring parents to send their children to public school (with
certain exceptions) as unreasonably interfering "with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control."268 Finally, in Buck v. Bell, 269 although
the exact reasons for Justice Butler's lone dissenting vote are
unknown, one possible explanation is that forced sterilization of the
feeble minded was inconsistent with his expansive view of personal
270
liberty and autonomy under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Justice Butler's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which provided broad
deference to the regulatory authority of the state in matters relating
to race and alienage but not for economic and personal liberties, is
more complex than it first seems. Commentators who characterize
Butler as a "monolithic conservative," part of the "conservative wing"
of the Court, or one of the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," often
fail to note the substantial jurisprudential distinctions between Butler
and his ideological allies on the Court. Unlike the other three, Butler
often took paradigmatically libertarian positions in cases involving the
rights of criminal defendants, especially under the Fourth
Amendment. Even his Fourteenth Amendment decisions, which have
since been widely criticized because they reinforced the inequality
among socioeconomic classes prior to the New Deal, are difficult to
characterize as quintessentially conservative because they arguably
set the stage for the substantive due process cases of the latter half of
271
the twentieth century.
268. Id. at 534-35.
269. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Butler, J., dissenting).
270. Perhaps Butler would have been viewed differently had he explained the reasons for his
dissent in Buck, one of the least celebrated decisions in Supreme Court history. For example,
Justice John Marshall Harlan was rarely thought of as one of the great Supreme Court Justices
until the 1950s when his views in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-64 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), were vindicated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I do not mean
to suggest that Butler would be lauded as one of the great Justices if he had explained his vote in
Buck, only that he might be remembered more favorably had he articulated the justifications for
his dissent.
271. In fact, some prominent scholars have asserted that the entire line of economic liberties
cases beginning with Lochner set the stage for Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and their progeny, which have a distinctly liberal character. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its Name,
117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1939 (2004) (arguing that the "ghost of Lochner was reborn in the guise
of Griswold v. Connecticut"). Moreover, even if one doubts the link between Lochner and the
Court's recent privacy cases, Justice Butler joined in two opinions of the Court that undoubtedly
set the stage for the Court's modern substantive due process case law. See id. at 1934
(characterizing Meyer and Pierce as the "two sturdiest pillars" of the modern "substantive due
process temple").
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B. A JudicialMinimalist and Deeply PrivateMan
One reason why Pierce Butler has been systematically
undertreated in the academic literature is that he served with some of
the most distinguished jurists ever to sit on the Court, including
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis Brandeis. 272 He
even served on the Court for more than seven years with former
President William Howard Taft.273 Butler, however, is rarely
mentioned in the same breath with these other jurists, partly because
he was a deeply private man who did not view his role as a Justice as
requiring public engagement. 274 Perhaps even more importantly,
Justice Butler often wrote short, mechanical opinions in low-profile
areas of the law, contrasting sharply to some of the other Justices with
whom he served. 275 Accordingly, he can be readily characterized as a
judicial minimalist, 276 avoiding broad pronouncements in favor of
answering only the questions directly raised by each case.
Justice Butler's minimalist approach can be traced, in part, to
his belief that judges deduce or discover legal principles through the
cases they decide. 277 This theory, a variation on natural law principles,
was an important aspect of Butler's judicial philosophy. As thenSolicitor General Robert Jackson recounted upon Butler's death in
1939:
Fearful of the rule of men in place of the rule of law, [Butler] appealed to the
accumulated body of the law as a continuous social expression and not as what might

272. Indeed, Butler's interactions with giants like Holmes were memorable. Once, after
persuading all of his colleagues except Holmes to vote in a certain way, Butler said, "I am glad
we have finally arrived at a just decision," to which Holmes replied, "[h]ell is paved with just
decisions." Burner, supra note 16, at 1086.
273. Taft, in fact, was influential in Butler's nomination to the Supreme Court. See supra
notes 90-124 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Associate Justice Butler of U.S. Supreme Court Speaks at Dedication of Civil
Courts Building, ST. LouIs DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, June 22, 1930 (on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review); see also Symposium, National Conference on JudicialBiography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
485, 487 (1995) (examining why certain Justices have received critical attention and discussing,
among other topics, the "Biographies of Titans: Holmes, Brandeis and other Obsessions").
275. See, e.g., McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 264-67 (1938) (seven paragraph
majority opinion); Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1930) (six paragraph majority opinion).
276. Although there are a number of conceptions of judicial minimalism in the scholarly
literature, this Part primarily works from the definition advanced by Cass Sunstein, which
stresses "two principal features, narrowness and shallowness" of judicial opinions and "the
phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as
possible undecided." CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3, 10-11 (1999).
277. E.g., Pierce Butler III Interview, supra note 17, at 18 (describing Justice Butler's
perception of the judge as one "whose job is to declare what the law is" and his philosophy as a
"belie[f] in the omni-presence theory of law, the natural law notion").
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appear at a particular time to be enlightened social self-interest. He did not believe that
the law is merely what the judges from time to time say it is. He believed that there is a
law that is greater than the judges and he was zealous to avoid its2 7misapplication
8
merely because the end in view appeared at the moment to be desirable.

When the Court went beyond the basic legal principles and language
required for a decision, Butler feared that "the specter of such
language would rise to plague the Court in the future. '279 Butler was
neither a "rhetorician"280 nor "a stylist,"281 and he "had no flair for an
unusual turn of a phrase or for the use of uncommon language. 28 2
Instead, "he wrote with economy of expression but with a precision
and clarity that never left doubt as to the meaning of his opinions or
as to the scope or effect of the decisions announced. '28 3 In short, his
opinions were "clear, forcible, and direct" 2 4 and were "free of obiter
285
dicta."
As his son Francis would later explain, Butler's minimalist
style was entirely intentional. Butler wanted to prevent attorneys
from opinion mining, in which advocates "find generalised [sic]
statements in some opinion or another which will apparently suit the
purpose of the advocate in the particular case although in fact
inapplicable to the facts on which the case was decided. '28 6 Butler also
believed that narrowly written opinions promoted the stability and
legitimacy of the Court. As he noted in an opinion toward the end of
his career, it was important that the Court's decisions be "sufficiently
'28 7
definite and permanent to enable counsel to advise [their] clients.
Butler's minimalism also extended to his concurring and
dissenting opinions, of which there were relatively few. Of the 359
total opinions that he authored, only four were concurrences. 28 8 Again
278. SUPREME COURT MEMORIAM, supra note 58, at 14 (statement of Solicitor General Robert
H. Jackson).
279. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3. In fact, Butler was such a strong
adherent to the principle of stare decisis that he even advocated in favor of it when it would
contradict his dissent in another case. Memorandum from Pierce Butler, Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, to Harlan F. Stone, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States 3 (Nov. 8, 1928) ("In order to avoid any possibility of impairing the zoning
decisions-and I did not agree with the first one-I think it better to let the decision rest upon the
ground stated in the opinion.") (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
280. RAMSEY COUNTY BAR MEMORIAM, supranote 66, at 7 (statement of Michael Doherty).
281. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 22 (statement of Wilfred Rumble).
282. Id.
283. RAMSEY COUNTY BAR MEMORIAM, supra note 66, at 8 (statement of Michael Doherty).
284. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 45 (statement of James O'Brien).
285. RAMSEY COUNTY BAR MEMORIAM, supranote 66, at 8 (statement of Michael Doherty).
286. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3.
287. R.R. Comm'n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 418 (1938) (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
288. SUPREME COURT MEMORIAM, supra note 58, at 29 (statement of Robert Taft).
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regarding concurring

[H]e was strong in his opinions on the decision but tolerant of other methods of
expressing that decision, to the end that there would not be a large group of opinions but
that the Court would stand as a 8whole
insofar as it could without violating the
2 9
principles of the individual Justices.

To Butler, the cost of concurring separately was that it would lead to
instability or ambiguity in the law; Butler believed that it was "most
desirable for the country to know what the law was without caviling
'290
over small pieces of language.
Even in dissent, Justice Butler was a minimalist, often
dissenting without comment or joining dissenting opinions written by
his colleagues. 29 1 Although dissenting opinions were less common prior
to the New Deal than they are today, 292 the number of dissenting
opinions on the Court rose as voting blocs formed during the 1920s
and 1930s. 293 In fact, during Butler's tenure, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis came to be known as much (or more) for their dissents as for
289. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 4. The papers of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
reveal Butler's willingness to incorporate language suggested by his colleagues when doing so
would not compromise the Court's holding. For example, in United States v. Schwimmer, 279
U.S. 644 (1929), Butler heeded Justice Stone's advice to "leave out the references to distrust and
dislike" of conscientious objectors, because of the potential for such language to give the
impression that the Court was "actuated by feelings of prejudice." Memorandum from Harlan F.
Stone, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to Pierce Butler, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 2 (May 23, 1929) [hereinafter Stone
Memorandum] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). Instead, Butler inserted Stone's
proposed language linking the Court's holding to the relevant statute. Compare Schwimmer, 279
U.S. at 652-53 ("It is obvious that the acts of such offenders evidence a want of that attachment
to the principles of the Constitution of which the applicant is required to give affirmative
evidence by the Naturalization Act."), with Stone Memorandum, supra, at 2 (same).
290. Hershberg Memorandum, supra note 21, at 4. One example of Butler's minimalism in
this regard is Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), in which he indicated that he was
"disposed to acquiesce in the opinion and conclusion reached," despite believing Justice Stone's
opinion to be a "tight squeeze on all points." Letter from Pierce Butler, Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, to Harlan F. Stone, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States (Apr. 14, 1939) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
291. E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937) (Butler, J., dissenting without
comment). When Justice Butler did write separately to note his dissent, his opinions were again
forceful, direct, and often short. His dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, discussed
above, spanned less than three pages. 277 U.S. 438, 485-88 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting). Even
in one of his lengthier dissents in the famous case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), Butler wrote separately to criticize the Court's decision to overrule Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), rather than resolving the case on narrower grounds. Erie, 304 U.S. at 87-90
(Butler, J., dissenting).
292. During the Taney Court, dissents never exceeded twenty-five percent of the Court's
overall docket. PERcivAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 18-19
(1969). That ratio declined slightly to a maximum of twenty-one percent during the pre-New
Deal Court, then rose dramatically to more than half of the decisions rendered after 1942. Id.
293. Id. at 167-70 (chronicling the formation of voting blocs on the Court during this period).
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their majority opinions.294 In contrast to Holmes and Brandeis, Butler
rarely wrote dissenting opinions, at least until his last few years on
the Court. 295 That minimalist tendency extended to even the most
important cases before the Court, such as Buck v. Bell, in which the
Court, in a notorious opinion written by Justice Holmes, upheld a
compulsory sterilization statute for the feeble minded. 296 Justice
Butler simply noted his dissent at the end of the opinion, 297 leaving
generations of scholars to speculate about whether his reason for
dissenting was religiously, philosophically, or doctrinally motivated. 298
Another stark example of Butler's silence in dissent is Palko v.
Connecticut,299 where he again dissented without opinion, despite his
30 0
otherwise strong views regarding the rights of criminal defendants.
Butler's lack of treatment in the scholarly literature is further
reinforced by the fact that he was a private man who viewed his public
role as a Justice narrowly. In one of the few newspaper articles in

294. As John Paul Frank has explained, "Justices Holmes and Brandeis gave the practice [of
dissent] a glorious connotation because their dissents were usually so far superior to the majority
opinions, and because so many of their dissents subsequently became the law." JOHN P. FRANK,
MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 126 (1958).

295. As discussed later in this Article, Butler authored over half of his dissents during his
last few years on the Supreme Court. See infra notes 427-28 and accompanying text. Though
Butler was hesitant to write separately, that began to change once his colleagues started
overruling cases that were decided earlier in his tenure, particularly those in which he had
authored the opinion. See id. Thus, it is possible to argue that Butler deviated from his
minimalist tendencies during his last two years on the Court, though it was often to attack his
colleagues for deviating from prior case law. A strong adherence to stare decisis, however, is
arguably consistent with judicial minimalism. See James E. Ryan, Does it Take A Theory?
Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623, 1634 (2006) (reviewing
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE BAD FOR
AMERICA (2005) and STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC

CONSTITUTION (2005)); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 402
(2006).

296. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
297. Id. at 208.
298. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
67 CATH. HIST. REV. 369, 378 (1981) (suggesting that Butler's muteness leaves his true
motivations for dissenting unknown).
299. 302 U.S. 319, 329 (1937).
300. See supra notes 194-228 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Butler's
jurisprudence involving the rights of criminal defendants). In yet another case, Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929), Butler wrote to Justice Van
Devanter that, though he disagreed with the holding reached by the Court, it was "doubtful
whether [a] dissenting opinion or noting of disagreement would do any good, and unless you['re]
inclined the other way, I am disposed to acquiesce." Memorandum from Pierce Butler, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, to Willis Van Devanter, Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 22, 1929) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
Interestingly, neither Justice Butler nor Justice Van Devanter dissented in the case. See White,
278 U.S. 456.
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which he permitted himself to be quoted, Butler explained the need for
judicial privacy:
Judges generally, and I think wisely, refrain from speaking. When one is required to
give consideration to both sides of a question, he properly may not indulge in sallies of
the imagination. Since becoming a member of the court I have generally asked to be
30 1
excused from taking prominent part in public ceremonies.

When asked what he thought of President Roosevelt's New Deal
policies for another newspaper article, Justice Butler said only that he
"won't talk about politics, nor medicine. '30 2
Remarkably, and contrary to the practice of many other
Justices of the period, Justice Butler ordered his clerk upon his death
to destroy anything relating to matters considered by the Court,
except published opinions, so his papers contain little of relevance to
his work as a Justice.3 0 3 Even seventy years after his death, Butler
still exerts posthumous control over his personal papers; those who
wish to examine them must secure express permission from his
descendants. 304
Butler's preferences to keep his views private, as well as his
minimalist approach to crafting opinions, were important facets of his
professional life. When writing for the Court, Butler wrote narrow
opinions free of dicta and musings about public policy. He also wrote
very few concurrences and dissents, often electing to dissent without
an opinion. Throughout his tenure as a Justice, he rarely spoke out on
matters of public concern 30 5 and permitted his published opinions to
speak for themselves. Those proclivities, along with his tendency to
write for the Court in areas of high legal and technical complexity but
low public salience, have all contributed to his lack of treatment in the
scholarly literature.

301. Associate Justice Butler of U.S. Supreme Court Speaks at Dedication of Civil Courts
Building, ST. LouIs DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, June 22, 1930 (on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
302. Justice Butler Catches Limit, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1937, at 20 (on
file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
303. Letter from Francis Butler to Paul E. Edlund, Acting Chief, Gift and Exchange Div.,
Library of Congress (Aug. 4, 1965) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review); Letter from Francis
Butler to David C. Mearns, Chief, Manuscript Div., Library of Congress (June 11, 1959) (on file
with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
304. I am thankful to Mrs. Pierce Butler III, who kindly gave my research assistant and me
access to all of the Butler family papers housed at the Minnesota Historical Society.
305. Like many Justices, Pierce Butler spoke occasionally at dedications of new buildings
and graduation ceremonies. E.g., Associate Justice Butler of U.S. Supreme Court Speaks at
Dedication of Civil Courts Building, ST. LOUIS DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, June 22, 1930.
However, even these events were rare.
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C. A Technical Justice
As much as or more than his contemporaries on the Court,
Butler focused his attention on highly technical areas of the law such
as public utilities regulation and taxation. Although there were
undoubtedly strong constitutional underpinnings to the cases that the
Supreme Court heard in those areas, Butler authored comparably few
opinions in areas of widespread political or legal salience. As a result,
Butler's jurisprudence has not been widely studied by scholars, nor
was it closely followed by the media of the period. Perhaps Butler's
most well-known opinion is his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,30 6 even though it is not nearly as prominent as the opinions
written by his colleagues in cases such as Buck v. Bell, 30 7 West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,30 8 or United States v. Carolene Products,30 9 much less
landmark decisions from other eras such as Marbury v. Madison310 or
311
Brown v. Board of Education.
Moreover, even in those areas where Butler wrote often, such
as in the fields of public utilities regulation and taxation, few of his
opinions hold much currency today despite their importance in the era
in which he served. Many have been explicitly or implicitly overruled,
and others have been effectively superseded by technological, legal, or
political advancements. Nowhere is that observation more applicable
than with respect to Butler's public utilities jurisprudence.
1. Public Utilities Regulation
During the 1920s and 1930s, railroads and other public
utilities flooded the Supreme Court with appeals, challenging the rate
312
schedules set by state legislatures and public utility commissions.
Justice Butler's extensive experience as a railroad attorney for the
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Omaha Railroad and in private
practice 313 positioned him to take a leadership role in this burgeoning
area of the Court's docket.
Asserting his leadership, Butler used his expertise to urge the
Court to adopt a cost of reproduction method for valuing the property

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

277 U.S. 438, 485-88 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
HOWELL, supra note 47, at 65.
See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
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of railroads and other public utilities. According to that method,
regulators must start with a "hypothetical condition" in which it is
assumed that the railroad or other utility does not exist, and then
regulators must determine how much it would cost to reproduce the
business at the time of the valuation proceedings. 314 Based on the cost
of reproduction of the business, a utility is
entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property
which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at
the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other
315
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties.

In other words, the cost of reproduction theory is a method of valuing
the tangible and intangible property of public utilities to ensure a rate
of return for utilities comparable to other businesses with similar
levels of risk in a competitive market.
Despite Butler's advocacy for the cost of reproduction theory, a
competing method of valuing utilities known as the prudent
investment theory attracted several adherents on the Court, including
Justice Louis Brandeis. Generally stated, the prudent investment
theory values the property of a utility as it serves the public; it is not
aimed at determining the value of a utility's property in a competitive
market. 31 6 Instead, public utilities are entitled only to a fair return on
the amount of money prudently invested in them as measured
primarily by the original cost of the capital invested and any overhead
31 7
or other reasonable expenses incurred in the provision of services.
Before Justice Butler joined the Supreme Court in 1922, the
stage had been set for vigorous debate over the merits of the two
competing valuation theories. 318 For years, the Supreme Court had
314. Brown, supra note 17, at 20.
315. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692
(1923).
316. HOWELL, supra note 47, at 69.
317. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 321, 325-26 (3d ed.
1993). As Phillips's leading treatise on public utilities regulation explains, "the prudent
investment standard... shift[s] attention from the left-hand, or asset, side to the right side of
the balance sheet, which constitutes the capital embarked in the enterprise." Id. at 326.
318. There are two primary differences between Butler's cost of reproduction theory and
Brandeis's prudent investment theory: time and scope. First, Justice Butler calculated the value
of a public utility at the time of the ratemaking proceedings, while Justice Brandeis considered
only the cost incurred by the utility at the point when the plant and any improvements were
originally constructed. Id. at 322-26. Second, Butler employed a broad measure of a utility's
value by comparing it to private business ventures and including measures for such intangible
property rights as goodwill and going value, while Brandeis narrowly calculated the value of a
public utility by examining only the amount prudently invested in it and counting only the
utility's property that was employed in the public interest. See supra note 316 and accompanying
text. In a decade when prices were rising steadily, the choice between these two theories was
stark, especially for public utilities companies, who had millions of dollars hanging in the
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come to varying conclusions in its attempts to determine the validity
of rates prescribed by state legislatures and public utilities
commissions. In its earliest attempt to resolve the issue in 1876, the
Court held in Munn v. Illinois that the setting of rates for businesses
"affected with a public interest" was exclusively a legislative function
and that, if such rates were too low to earn a reasonable rate of
return, legislative action was the only recourse. 19 Put another way,
the Munn case established the principle that rate setting for public
320
utilities was not subject to judicial review.
After several cases limiting the scope of Munn, 32 ' the Supreme
Court finally reversed course in Smyth v. Ames and held that public
utilities were entitled to a "fair return" on the "fair value" of their
property used for the public interest. 322 According to the Court, rates
that were set too low to earn a fair return were confiscatory, depriving
a utility and its investors of their property rights in violation of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. 323 The
Court further held that, despite its contrary declaration in Munn, it
served as the final authority on the constitutionality of the rates set
by state legislatures and public utility commissions. 324 But the Court
was vague regarding how it would evaluate the reasonableness of such
rates:
[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a
corporation... must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the
convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of
construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and
market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of
construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates
prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters
balance. Compare, e.g., McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 420-21 (1926)
(holding, in an opinion by Justice Butler, that a rate of return of no less than 7% of the value of
the utility-$19 million-was the minimum necessary to avoid being confiscatory), with id. at
422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that a lower rate would not be confiscatory and that a $19
million valuation was "clearly in error").
319. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126, 133-34 (1876). Munn involved Illinois legislation
that set a schedule of maximum prices on grain elevators located in the city of Chicago. Id. at
123. The Supreme Court extended the Munn rule to the regulation of railroads in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 161 (1877).
320. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 133-34 ("For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.").
321. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) (asserting that
review of rate regulations was "within the scope of judicial power and a part of judicial duty");
Chicago, Minneapolis & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (holding that "[tihe
question of the reasonableness of a rate charge for transportation by a railroad company. .. is
eminently a question for judicial investigation").
322. 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
323. Id. at 522-24.
324. Id. at 526-27.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:695

for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case.
We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the
325
value of the property.

Like Lochner and other economic liberty cases of the period, protection
of private property rights was the driving force behind Smyth, 326 but
the Court provided little guidance about how to value those property
rights. It stated, in essence, that all factors must be considered by the
courts in conducting the valuation, including the "original cost of
construction"
and
the
"amount
expended
in
permanent
improvements," which are the foundation for the prudent investment
theory, in addition to the "present cost" of "construction," which is at
327
the core of the cost of reproduction theory.
In the twenty-five years following Smyth, the Court either
evaded fair value claims by holding that such claims were
inadequately proven or premature, 328 or it was equivocal regarding the
controlling standard for valuing utility property. 329 When Butler
joined the Court in 1922, he was already known as one of the
strongest proponents of the cost of reproduction theory. 330 As Justice
Butler explained in a 1915 article:
Doubtless everyone will admit that no other enterprise has done so much for the
development of the greater part of this country as have the railroads, and that it would
be a great calamity if they were to be dealt with in such a way as to impair their
331
usefulness as instruments of public service and progress.

325. Id. at 546-47.
326. Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 251, 261-62 (1984).
327. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546-47; see also supratext accompanying notes 314-17.
328. William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory
Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protectionsof the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 429, 450 (2005).
329. See PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 326 (noting that the Court "consistently refused to
resolve the controversy" between the two theories of valuation). In the early part of the twentieth
century, public utilities and state utility commissions switched sides in the debate over the
competing valuation methods. Id. at 321. Prior to World War I when prices were stable, public
utilities generally argued for original cost while utility commissions applied a reproduction cost
formula. Id. But when construction prices began to soar during and after World War I, utilities
began to demand consideration of reproduction cost in determining the fair value of utility
property, while commissions endorsed an original cost formula. Id. at 322.
330. Brown, supra note 17, at 9.
331. Pierce Butler, Valuation of Railway Propertyfor Purposes of Rate Regulation, 23 J. POL.
ECON. 17, 17-18 (1915). Butler viewed the low rates set by many public utility commissions as
an unconstitutional deprivation of the private property rights of railroads and its investors. See
id. at 25 (emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment prohibits states from setting rates "so
unreasonable and low as not to yield a fair return upon the full value of the property"). According
to Butler, 'The title to railroad property is not held either in whole or in part for the use or
benefit of the public. The company has full title and ownership." Id. at 26.
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Butler believed the country benefited from the expansion of railroads
and recognized that "many considerations suggest[ed] the wisdom and
justice of allowing railway carriers liberal and generous rates." 332 In
Butler's view, however, utility commissions often set rates "so low"
that they did not permit a fair return on the value of a railroad's
333
property.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that Butler successfully led the
charge on the Supreme Court in favor of the cost of reproduction
theory early in his tenure. 334 During his first partial Term on the
Court in early 1923, the Court decided two cases that established the
cost of reproduction theory as the predominant valuation method. In
335
the first case, argued several weeks before Butler joined the Court,
the Court held that the Public Service Commission of Missouri erred
in valuing Southwestern Bell Telephone Company's property "without
according any weight to the greatly enhanced costs of material, labor,
supplies, etc." at the time of the ratemaking investigation.3 36 Similar
to the economic liberties cases discussed above,3 37 the foundation for
the Court's opinion in Southwestern Bell was robust protection of
private property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 338
In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service
Commission,339 a case decided several weeks after Southwestern Bell,
Butler had his first opportunity to write for the Court on the

332. Id. at 29.
333. Id. at 18.
334. The concerns of critics of his nomination that feared that he would be biased in favor of
railroads appeared to be well-founded. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Although I do
not mean to suggest that Butler acted improperly in advancing his cost of reproduction theory
while serving on the Court, he did raise eyebrows when he participated in a 1936 Supreme Court
case involving his former client, the Great Northern Railway. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297
U.S. 135 (1936). Recusal decisions have always been left up to the discretion of members of the
judiciary, except in limited circumstances, and there is a long history of Justices that have
participated in cases where the ethical course of action is not always clear. See generally Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987) (reviewing the
history of judicial recusal and the controversy surrounding judges' decisions not to recuse
themselves).
335. Because the opinion was released several months after Butler was confirmed and there
is no indication that he declined to participate, it appears that Butler took an active part in the
consideration of this case, although it is unclear what role he played in the outcome or the
opinion itself. See Brown, supra note 17, at 24 (observing that Justice Butler's "influence, if
any, . . . on the decision is not evident from the record").
336. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 287 (1923).
337. See supra notes 229-48 and accompanying text.
338. See Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 287 ("The property [of utilities] is held in private ownership,
and it is that property, and not the original cost of it, of which the owner may not be deprived
without due process of the law." (quoting Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 454 (1913))).
339. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
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constitutionality of public utility rates. The Public Service
Commission of West Virginia had fixed maximum rates for a company
that furnished water to the residents of Bluefield, Virginia. 340 The
company argued unsuccessfully before the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia that those rates were confiscatory. 341 The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, holding that the Commission "did
not accord proper, if any, weight to the greatly enhanced costs of
construction" at the time of the ratemaking investigation. 342 Justice
Butler believed that the rates set by the Commission were too low
because the Commission failed to consider the cost of reproducing the
utility's property. 343 Beyond explaining how the rate base should be
calculated, Butler went on to describe how to compute a fair rate of
return on the utility's property, a point on which the Court had rarely
spoken since Smyth v. Ames:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of
the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks
and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or
344
anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures.

According to Butler, a variety of factors should have been considered
in determining a fair rate of return, including (1) "the financial
soundness of the utility . . under efficient and economical
management," (2) its ability "to maintain and support its credit and
enable it to raise the money necessary for proper discharge of its
public duties," and (3) the "money market and business conditions
generally. 3 4 5 In setting a fair rate of return, the Court stated, no
single factor was determinative, and utility commissions were
required to consider "all relevant facts" and exercise "enlightened
346
judgment."
Just three years later, Justice Butler once again took the
opportunity to expand the cost of reproduction method in McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co. 34 7 Affirming the lower court's judgment
invalidating confiscatory rates set by the Indiana Public Service
Commission, Butler, writing for the majority, found that the

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.
272 U.S. 400 (1926).
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Commission erred in estimating the fair value of the utility's property
using a ten-year trailing average of prices ending two years before the
rate-making investigation. He specifically noted that during those two
348
years, prices had already increased by thirty to thirty-five percent.
In an arguable departure from prior utility rate cases, Butler further
stated that the cost of reproduction theory required "an honest and
intelligent forecast as to probable price and wage levels during a
period in the immediate future" in addition to consideration of such
levels "at the time of the investigation." 349 In other words, the theory
required "a reasonable rate of return on the value of the property at
the time of the investigation and for a reasonable time in the
immediate future."3 50 Butler additionally declared that the applicable
rate base must also include the value of intangible property, such as
water rights, going value, and good will.35 1 In adopting a nonconfiscatory cost of reproduction value of $19 million for the water
company, Butler rejected valuations based upon the original cost of
the utility's property of $10 million and even the Commission's higher
estimate of $15.3 million, which was based on the cost of reproduction
two years prior to the Commission's consideration of the utility's
rates.

352

While Butler and his allies on the Court made steady progress
toward entrenching cost of reproduction as the prevailing standard in
rate cases, 353 Justice Louis Brandeis led a minority of Justices in
opposing it. In Southwestern Bell, for instance, Brandeis authored a
lengthy dissent criticizing the majority for adopting a standard that
was "laborious," "baffling," and even circular. 354 The "most serious
vice," according to Brandeis, was that "the method [did] not lead to
certainty. Under it, the value for ratemaking purposes must ever be

348. Id. at 411-12.
349. Id. at 408-09.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 413-15; HOWELL, supra note 47, at 78.
352. PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 323.
353. Though the cost of reproduction theory dominated the Court's consideration of the
reasonableness of public utility rates during the first decade of Butler's tenure, the Court never
concluded that it was the sole method on which to calculate the rate base. Instead, in many
cases, the Court held that it was an essential factor for public utility commissions to consider
along with the many other factors discussed in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
354. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Mo., 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Brandeis criticized the cost of reproduction method as circular to the extent that it
calculated the value of utilities by capitalizing their net earnings because such earnings are
determined primarily by the rates that a utility will be permitted to charge, which is the core
question in ratemaking investigations. Id.
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an unstable factor." 355 The prudent investment theory, on the other

hand, would
offer a basis for decision which is certain and stable. The rate base would be ascertained
as a fact, not determined as a matter of opinion. It would not fluctuate with the market
price of labor, or materials, or money. It would not change with hard times or shifting
populations. It would not be distorted by the fickle and varying judgments of appraisers,
commissions, or courts. It would, when once made in respect to any utility, be fixed, for
all time ....356

After all, Brandeis asserted, the market or exchange value of utility
property was "not of legal significance" because such property was
rarely exchanged in the marketplace, and a utility fully engaged its
property to provide a public service as a "substitute for the state. '357
According to Brandeis, therefore, a rate of return was "constitutionally
compensatory" if it permitted a utility to earn a "fair return on the
amount prudently invested in it" and afforded it "the opportunity to
'358
earn the cost of service.
The onset of the Great Depression-which led to falling prices
in land, raw materials, and labor-and changes in Court personnel
eventually led to the demise of the cost of reproduction theory.35 9 The
theory began to lose support in the 1933 case of Los Angeles Gas &
355. Id. at 308. As Stephen Siegel has pointed out, however, the prudent investment theory
is not free from administrative difficulties. For instance, to attract new capital, the theory
required setting railroad and utility rates of return higher than "prevailing rates to compensate
investors for ...unique" limits on investments in the public utility context, yet politicians were
unlikely to set above-normal rates of return when the general public was generally seeking lower
utility rates. Siegel, supra note 326, at 238-39.
356. Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 306-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 290-92. In a later case, Justice Stone harshly attacked the cost of reproduction
theory along similar lines, calling it "the most speculative undertaking imposed upon [courts] in
the entire history of English jurisprudence." West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S.
662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
358. Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 289, 291; HOWELL, supra note 47, at 70. The cost of service, as
defined by Brandeis, consisted of capital charges, including an allowance for the use of capital,
"the risk incurred," and a sufficient return "to attract [additional] capital," as well as operating
expenses, such as the cost of labor and raw materials. Sw. Bell, 262 U.S. at 291.
359. See PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 327 (explaining that a judicial shift away from the cost
of reproduction theory began in 1933). Around this time, scholars and commentators also began
to criticize the cost of reproduction theory. For instance, the Interstate Commerce Commission
continued to defend the use of original cost or prudent investment formulas in valuing public
utilities. Id. One prominent commentator, Ben Lewis, summarized the prevailing criticism
against the cost of reproduction theory at the time, referring to it as "the unpredictable product
of incalculable considerations" that bear "no derivative relation to any figures in evidence and no
ascertainable relation to any functional purpose of rate making" and resulting only in "indecision
and confusion." Ben W. Lewis, Public Utilities, in 2 GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE 616, 69294 (Leverett S. Lyon & Victor Abramson eds., 1940). For instance, using a cost of reproduction
theory, the nation's railroads would have been worth nearly $18 billion in 1914, $41 billion by
1920, but then would have dropped to $31 billion just three years later. See PHILLIPS, supra note
317, at 336 (using estimations computed by the Interstate Commerce Commission).
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Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission of California,in which the Court
held that, though the cost of reproduction theory was relevant in
determining the reasonableness of rates, the Commission was not
limited to that valuation method. 360 In addition to selecting original
cost as the basis for its determination of rates, the California Railroad
Commission did not include allowances for going value in its
36 1
valuation, a factor considered under the cost of reproduction theory.
Despite the Commission's emphasis on original cost, the Court, in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, upheld the rates because
the Commission did not deduct the cost of an obsolete gas
manufacturing plant and added nearly $5 million to the historical cost
362
of $60,704,000 to calculate "fair value."
Justice Butler predictably dissented in the case because, in his
view, the Court and the Commission refused "to give any weight" to
reproduction cost in its determination of whether the rates were
confiscatory. 363 Butler also criticized the majority for permitting the
Commission to exclude express consideration of going value. 364 To the
extent that going value was considered by the Court or the
Commission, Butler continued, the figure was "arrived at upon
considerations that ha[d] no relation to any amount that in any view
reasonably may be assigned to that element."365 He disagreed with the
majority that the Commission's valuation method was merely a
"relevant fact," and thus he would have concluded that the "rates
should [have been] set aside because [they were] arrived at by
366
arbitrary methods condemned by our decisions."
The Court sustained valuations based on original cost in four
additional cases between 1934 and 1938.367 By 1938, Butler had all
but lost the war in utility rate cases. 368 In Butler's last gasp on the

360. 289 U.S. 287, 305-06 (1933). In other words, the Court focused primarily on the end
result of the Commission's findings, the rates imposed on the utility, rather than the question of
whether the Commission used the preferred methodology to calculate those rates.
361. Id. at 297.
362. Id. at 316-17.
363. Id. at 323 (Butler, J., dissenting).
364. See id. at 324-26 (explaining that when "any going value exists, the amount justly
attributable thereto must be ascertained and included").
365. Id. at 325.
366. Id. at 326.
367. PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 328 (citing R.R. Comm'n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,
302 U.S. 388 (1938); Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470 (1938);
Lindheimer v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934); and Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290 (1934)).
368. The Court's rapidly changing jurisprudence in utility rate cases generally coincides in
time with its landmark reversal in economic liberties cases starting with West Coast Hotel v.
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issue in 1938, he once again dissented from an opinion of the Court
approving the use of original cost in a valuation proceeding conducted
by the California Railroad Commission. 369 "Because the Commission
refused to pay any attention to the company's evidence of reproduction
cost" or include anything "in its rate base to cover intangible elements
of value," Butler would have set aside the order "as having been made
without procedural due process of the law." 370 Exhibiting his
frustration more generally with the Court's decisive change of course
in utility rate cases, Butler protested "against the Court's refusal to
deal with the case disclosed by the record and reasonably to adhere to
principles that have been settled."3 71 According to Butler, the Court's
decisions "ought to be sufficiently definite and permanent to enable
counsel usefully to advise clients. Generally speaking, at least, [the
Court's] decisions of yesterday ought to be the law of today." 372
Nearly six years after Butler's death, the Court abandoned the
fair .value rule of Smyth v. Ames altogether in Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 373 Despite the fact that the
Court eventually discarded Butler's cost of reproduction theory, his
contribution to the jurisprudence of public utilities regulation can
hardly be characterized as inconsequential for several reasons. First,
the cost of reproduction theory dominated the Court's jurisprudence
for over a decade. Indeed, many courts, including the Supreme Court,
continue to discuss and cite Justice Butler's most important opinions
in the area, including Bluefield Water Works. 374 Second, the cost of
reproduction theory still remains a viable method of valuing utilities,
especially in periods of high inflation. 375 One prominent treatise notes
that if rates for public utilities are based on original cost during an
inflationary period, then such rates will result in "an excessive
increase in the demand for the services of public utilities relative to
the demand for other commodities and, in turn, will require an
Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937), suggesting more generally that the Court was retreating from its
robust role in economic regulation in a variety of areas.
369. R.R. Comm'n of Cal. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 402 (1938) (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
370. Id. at 402, 408, 415.
371. Id. at 418.
372. Id.

373. 320 U.S. 591 (1944); see also PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 328 (discussing the impact of
the Hope Natural Gas case).
374. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (citing Bluefield
Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923)). According
to a Westlaw search conducted on August 6, 2008, Bluefield Water Works has been cited in over
1700 cases and administrative decisions.
375. PHILLIPS, supra note 317, at 331.
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expansion in the capacity of public utilities' plans in order to satisfy
the new demand." 376 Such a scenario leads to "wasteful consumption"
of resources. 3 77 Third, a handful of state utility commissions still rely
on "fair value or current value" in setting rates, essentially using the
378
modern equivalent of Butler's cost of reproduction theory.
More fundamentally, however, Butler wrote over ninety
opinions that were related in some way to public utilities or the
welfare of the nation's railroads.37 9 While important to the nation's
infrastructure of the period, Butler's extensive work in the area of
public utilities regulation, as in the taxation area, demonstrates that
he focused much of his attention and energy on highly technical areas
of the law rather than the high-profile constitutional law cases that
interested many of his colleagues.
2. Tax Law
Consistent with his predispositions toward limited government
and robust private property rights, Butler was skeptical of
governmental taxation efforts. In authoring over seventy opinions in
tax-related cases, 380 Butler used a variety of tools to limit or strike
down state and federal taxes. For instance, he strictly adhered to the
doctrine of reciprocal tax immunity between federal and state
governments and used a variety of constitutional tools, including the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, to impede
governmental taxation efforts. Indeed, one commentator went so far
as to write that Butler voted against state or federal taxes "wherever
38 1
conceivable grounds could be found."
Butler's hostility to taxation can be traced to his laissez-faire
philosophy, which was a product of his own background and his
studies of Amasa Walker's Briefer Political Economy at Carleton
College. 38 2 As a child, Butler was taught to value hard work, self-

376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 338.
379. Ninety-two results were found when the following Westlaw search was conducted on
January 26, 2009, in the Supreme Court database: "au (Butler) and sy,di (railway or railroad or
utility)." Though only a rough measure, this search reveals that approximately twenty-eight
percent of the 327 majority opinions that Justice Butler authored were related to public utilities
or the nation's railroads.
380. Eighty-one results were found when the following Westlaw search was conducted on
January 26, 2009, in the Supreme Court database: "au (Butler) & sy,di (tax!)." Approximately
twenty-five percent of Butler's majority opinions were in tax-related cases.
381. Burner, supra note 16, at 1082.

382. See supranotes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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reliance, and determination, and that government was to play only a
limited role in society:
He felt the secret of America's success lay in the opportunity afforded to the individual,
protected by the constitution and that individual enterprise, ingenuity and courage
would be undermined and weakened, if not destroyed, by a paternalistic government as
exemplified by the extension of governmental power over the individual, over private
383
enterprise, and over purely state or local matters.

In the rare instances that Butler spoke publicly about his views, a
consistent theme of his speeches was limited government. 3 4 As he
stated at a meeting of the Minnesota Bar Association before his
appointment as a Justice, "Too much paternalism, too much wetnursing by the state, is destructive of initiative and development. An
athlete should not be fed on pre-digested food, nor should the citizens
of tomorrow be so trained that they will expect sustenance from the
public 'pap.' ",385 Thus, consistent with his stance in a number of
prominent Fourteenth Amendment cases, 38 6 Butler took positions in
tax cases that were "favorable toward constitutional protection of
economic liberties through judicial restriction of government
38 7
action."
In fact, Butler voted to invalidate several state and local tax
laws on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 8 In perhaps his
most famous tax opinion, Coolidge v. Long,38 9 Justice Butler wrote for
the Court in invalidating a Massachusetts inheritance tax that
retroactively taxed a vested property interest conveyed by an
irrevocable trust deed. 390 According to Butler, a tax on property after
the right to "possession and enjoyment" of the property "had fully
vested before the enactment" was "repugnant to the contract clause of
the Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 39 1 Unlike many of Butler's other Fourteenth
383. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MEMORIAM, supra note 8, at 8.
384. In a 1926 address to Catholic women at Soldier Field, Butler argued that "care should
be taken lest activities of government be expanded beyond their public sphere. It is possible by
too many enactments and regulations to impair the dignity of law and respect for authority."
Justice Butler Says Church Is Nation's Guide, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., June 23, 1926.
385. DANELSKI, supra note 3, at 17; HOWELL, supranote 47, at 309.
386. See supranotes 229-71 and accompanying text.
387. KEARNEY, supra note 177, at 6.
388. See Brown, supra note 17, at 50-51 (explaining that "[t]he due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were the constitutional arguments most
frequently used by Justice Butler and the conservatives in nullifying state taxation" and listing
the cases in which those arguments were made).
389. 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
390. Id. at 605-06.
391. Id. at 599, 605-06. Writing for three other Justices, Justice Owen Roberts vigorously
dissented to the result in the case, disagreeing with Butler that the property had vested in the
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Amendment opinions,392 Coolidge remains good law with respect to a
state's inability to tax vested property interests retroactively, but its
impact has been diminished somewhat by the Court's tendency in
later cases to factually distinguish the law in Coolidge from other
similar taxation schemes. 393 Butler also authored or joined opinions of
the Court that struck down state and local taxes based on the
Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the
394
Fourteenth Amendment.
Butler was involved in another source of deep division on the
Court: invalidation of state and local tax laws based upon the
Constitution's Commerce Clause. In a series of decisions during the
beneficiaries before the inheritance tax was enacted and that the Contracts Clause limited the
Commonwealth's ability to tax the property in question. Id. at 617 ("The Coolidge children could
not obtain possession or control of the corpus despite their parents' release of all interest in it.
The trustees still had duties to perform."); id. at 638 (stating that "the power to tax property" is
"no wise[sic] hindered or impeded by the fact of the existence of the contract whether it antedates
or follows the effective date of the taxing act").
It bears mentioning that Butler had a similar view about federal taxes operating
retroactively on vested property interests. In at least two cases, Butler joined an opinion of the
Court invalidating such taxes under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927) (Butler, J., joining an opinion authored by
Justice McReynolds invalidating a federal statute under the Fifth Amendment that retroactively
taxed property transferred by a decedent prior to the statute's passage, even if "the conveyance
was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [the decedent's] death"); see
also Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927) (Butler, J., joining an opinion authored by Justice
McReynolds that held a gift tax with retroactive effects in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
392. See supra notes 235-71 and accompanying text.
393. See Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Note, Death Is Still Certain, But Are Taxes?: An
Examination of the Due Process Limitations on Retroactive Tax Legislation After Carlton v.
United States, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 327, 333-34 (1993) (explaining that the Court "retreated
from these early estate and gift tax decisions, often by distinguishing them factually") (internal
citation omitted). Coolidge's importance is also diminished by the Court's greater willingness to
tolerate retroactivity with respect to income taxes than estate and gift taxes. See Kyle D. Logue,
Tax Transitions, OpportunisticRetroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1168 & n.130 (1996) ("According to the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on retroactive federal income taxation, to survive a due process challenge
Congress's decision to apply a tax change retroactively need only pass the 'rational-basis' test.");
Pat Castellano, Comment, Retroactively Taxing Done Deals: Are There Limits?, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 417, 447 (1995) ("Although the Supreme Court consistently upheld retroactive income tax
legislation because it serves a legitimate legislative purpose, the Supreme Court was less
deferential to retroactive gift and estate tax legislation affecting voluntary, vested
transactions.").
394. See, e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 433 (1935) (Butler, J., joining an opinion
authored by Justice Sutherland that set aside a Vermont law that exempted from taxation
income from intrastate loans, but not those originating from out of state, on the basis of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928) (invalidating a Pennsylvania tax on the gross receipts of
taxicab operators on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was levied solely on "incorporated operators" and not on "natural persons and
partnerships").
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1920s and 1930s, Butler voted to invalidate such laws based on their
interference with interstate and foreign commerce. 395 For example, in
New Jersey Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment of
New Jersey, Butler authored the majority opinion setting aside a New
Jersey tax on the gross receipts of a telecommunications company
because a portion of those receipts were derived from interstate
commerce. 396 In yet another case, Butler employed the "original
package" doctrine of Brown v. Maryland39 7 to invalidate an Alabama
franchise tax.398 Although Alabama was attempting to tax the value of
bags of nitrate fertilizer brought into the state by the Anglo-Chilean
company through the port in Mobile, Alabama, it was clear to Butler
that the franchise tax was "in substance" a tax on imports that
burdened foreign commerce. 399 When a majority of the Court upheld
laws that Butler viewed as burdensome to interstate or foreign
commerce, he noted his dissent in his customarily concise but direct
language, such as in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher:
The facts stated in the opinion just announced leave nothing of substance to support its
conclusion that the California tax is not upon the operation-maintenance and use-of
appellant's railroad for interstate transportation. Discussion can neither obscure nor
more plainly disclose the trust that the tax in question directly burdens commerce
among the States. Concededly, that is repugnant
to the commerce clause as, from the
400
beginning, it has been construed by this Court.

While Butler voted on several notable occasions to sustain state and
local tax laws against Commerce Clause challenge, 40 1 he was more
receptive than virtually any of his colleagues to claims that such laws
placed an impermissible burden on interstate and foreign
402
commerce.
395. E.g., Puget Sound v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Cooney v. Mountain States Tel.
Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935); State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931);
Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555
(1925); Tex. Transp. & Terminal Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 160 (1924).
396. 280 U.S. 338, 349 (1930).
397. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Brown, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in
holding that it was unconstitutional for a state or locality to tax goods that were imported in
their original packaging and then transported through the state or locality to be sold elsewhere.
Id. at 457.
398. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218, 229 (1933).
399. Id. at 225, 229. Justice Cardozo, by contrast, would have characterized the franchise tax
not as a tax on imports, but as a tax on the privilege of doing business within the State of
Alabama. Id. at 232-33 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
400. 306 U.S. 167, 181 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting).
401. E.g., Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292
U.S. 86 (1934); Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1934); E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931); Lacoste v. Dep't. of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924).
402. Barry Cushman has written that "the Four Horsemen repeatedly sustained the power of
big government to take other people's money," that they "upheld scores of taxes on business in
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Consistent with his laissez-faire approach to taxation
questions, Butler also strictly adhered to the principle "that neither
the Federal nor state governments could tax the agencies or
instrumentalities of the other."40 3 The tax immunity doctrine had its
genesis in Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland, in which the Court held that the state of Maryland could
not constitutionally tax the issuance of currency by a branch of the
Bank of the United States. 404 On the question of intergovernmental
tax immunity, Butler was an absolutist; he believed that virtually any
taxation of a federal or state agency, employee, or instrumentality by
the other violated the principles of McCulloch, regardless of the
amount of the tax or the extent of interference with governmental
405
functions.
Not surprisingly, Butler authored several opinions extending
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity in a variety of
the face of every conceivable manner of constitutional challenge," and even that they were "closet
liberals," whose intent was to work "surreptitiously to undermine the very causes that their
conservative patrons held most dear." Cushman, supra note 71, at 560-61. While it is true that
Butler and the other so-called "Horsemen" did vote in a number of cases to sustain taxes in a
variety of contexts, Cushman overstates his case at least insofar as Butler is concerned. Indeed,
in many of the closely divided cases involving the constitutionality of federal, state, or local
taxes, Butler voted to invalidate such taxes on the basis of a myriad of constitutional provisions,
many of which I discuss in this Article. In these cases, rarely was Butler joined by Justices that
are traditionally viewed by historians as liberal, such as Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone, or
Holmes. See, e.g., Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933) (holding, in
an opinion by Justice Butler joined by the other "Horsemen," that an Alabama franchise tax on
bags of nitrate fertilizer violated the Commerce Clause, with Justices Stone, Cardozo and
Brandeis dissenting); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931) (holding, in an opinion by Justice
Butler, that a state inheritance tax as applied to a trust deed violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, over the dissent of Justices Roberts, Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis);
Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930) (holding, in an opinion by
Justice Butler, that a Missouri tax on insurance companies violated the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity, with Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis dissenting);
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (holding, in an opinion by Justice
Butler, that a tax levied solely against "incorporated operators" and not on "natural persons and
partnerships" was arbitrary and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause, with Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting).
403. Brown, supra note 17, at 46.
404. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819). The concept of state immunity from federal taxation,
by contrast, did not become firmly established until 1870 when the Supreme Court decided in
Collector v. Day that a state judge could not be subjected to federal income tax on the money that
he earned as a judge. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870).
405. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 428 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting)
(holding that "[i]t is an established principle of our constitutional system of dual government"
that the states cannot tax the "instrumentalities, means and operations whereby the United
States exercises its governmental powers," the federal government cannot tax the
"instrumentalities, means and operations whereby the states exert the governmental powers
belonging to them," and that "[w]here th[is] principle applies it is not affected by the amount of
the particular tax or the extent of the resulting interference, but is absolute").
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contexts. In Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir,40 6 for example, Butler
invalidated an Oklahoma ad valorem tax on an Indian mining
company on the ground that the company was an instrumentality of
the U.S. government, which had assumed guardianship of the
landowners and their tribe. 40 7 In another case, Butler wrote an
opinion setting aside a Mississippi excise tax on gasoline dealers as
applied to sales to the U.S. Coast Guard because "[w]hile Mississippi
[could] impose charges upon [the dealer] for the privilege of carrying
on trade that is subject to the power of the State, it [could] not lay any
tax upon transactions by which the United States secures the things
desired for its governmental purposes." 40 8 In the last significant case
in which Butler spoke for a majority of the Court on the question of
intergovernmental tax immunity, Butler struck down an Alabama
40 9
excise tax on gasoline sold to the United States.
Butler's broad vision for intergovernmental tax immunity,
however, began to lose ground in the 1930s at about the same time
that the Court was reversing course on economic liberties and public
utilities cases. 410 In 1938, the Court weakened the tax immunity
doctrine by deciding two cases that substantially curtailed the ability
of states to avoid federal taxation. 4 11 In both cases, Butler vehemently
dissented, pointing out in one that "[e]xpressly or sub silentio, [the

406. 271 U.S. 609 (1926).
407. Id. at 612-14.
408. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 221 (1928).
409. See Graves v. Tex. Co., 298 U.S. 393, 400-01 (1936). In Graves, the Court rejected a
construction of the Alabama statute proffered by the Attorney General of Alabama that the
excise tax was on the storage of gasoline, not its withdrawal and sale to the United States. Id. at
398-40. But even if the tax was on mere storage, Butler still would have invalidated it under the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity:
A tax upon anything so essential to the sale of the gasoline to the United
States is as objectionable as would be a tax upon the sale itself.... So far as
concerns the federal immunity from state taxation, a tax upon storing or
withdrawal so involved cannot be distinguished from the tax on sales
imposed by the Mississippi statute condemned as unconstitutional.
Id. at 401.
410. Eduard A. Lopez, The Constitutional Doctrines of State Immunity from Federal
Regulation and Taxation After Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 4 J.L. &
POL. 89, 95 (1987).
411. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 419 (1938) (holding that states were not
immune from federal taxation of "activities thought not to be essential to the preservation of
state governments"); see also Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386 (1938)
(holding that states were not immune from federal taxes on income derived from a lease of school
lands because interference with state government "cannot be supported by merely theoretical
conceptions of interference with the functions of government").
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Court] overrule[d] a century of precedents" 412 and in the other that the
4 13
Court overruled a "long line of decisions of this and other Courts."
As Butler stated in Mountain Producers Corp., the first of the two
1938 intergovernmental tax immunity cases, the Court's opinion
brought "forward no real reason for so sweeping a change of
construction of the Constitution." 414 Though the majority explained in
one of the 1938 cases that state immunity from federal taxation was
"narrowly limited,"4 1 by 1939 the Court had started to retreat from
41 6
even strict enforcement of federal immunity from state taxation.
The Court held in Graves v. New York, for example, that the salaries
of employees of the Home Owners Loan Corporation, a federal
instrumentality, could be taxed through state income taxes without
offending intergovernmental tax immunity principles. 4 17 In doing so,
the Court expressly overruled a case decided just two years before,
New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves,418 in which it had prohibited state
taxation of the salary of an employee of a wholly owned corporate
instrumentality of the United States. 41 9 Justice Butler again
dissented, criticizing the majority for overruling long-established
doctrine:
Appraisal of lurking or apparent implications of the Court's opinion can serve no useful
end for, should occasion arise, they may be ignored or given direction different from that
at first seemingly intended. But safely it may be said that presently marked for
destruction is the doctrine of reciprocal immunity that by recent decisions here has been
so much impaired.420

Despite having many of his tax opinions overruled by a Court
in transition by the late 1930s, Butler made his greatest enduring
412. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. at 430 (Butler, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Gerhardt, Butler
again advanced his view that intergovernmental tax immunity is "not affected by the amount of
the particular tax or the extent of the resulting interference, but is absolute." Id. at 428.
413. Mountain Producers,303 U.S. at 390 (Butler, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 390-91. Mountain Producers, in particular, drew Butler's opinion in Jaybird
Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926), into substantial doubt by overruling Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), a case that formed the foundation for Jaybird Mining, and by
holding that a federal tax on the profits of a company "operating under a government contract or
lease" with Wyoming resulted in only an "indirect and remote" tax on the state. Mountain
Producers,303 U.S. at 386-87.
415. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. at 415 (Butler, J., dissenting) (characterizing the immunity
recognized in Collector v. Day as "narrowly limited to a state judicial officer engaged in the
performance of a function which pertained to state governments at the time the Constitution was
adopted"); id. at 412 ('The exercise of the national taxing power is thus subject to a safeguard
which does not operate when a state undertakes to tax a national instrumentality.").
416. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting).
417. Id. at 487.
418. 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
419. Id. at 408-09.
420. Graves, 306 U.S. at 493 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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contributions to modern tax jurisprudence in cases involving ordinary
statutory construction. Butler truly earned the label of a "technician"
in deciding largely mundane cases involving federal tax statutes,
sometimes publishing
detailed
mathematical
formulas
and
calculations to support or explain the Court's holding in particular
cases. 421 In light of Butler's constitutional jurisprudence and his
laissez-faire philosophy, it is not surprising that he often narrowly
construed such statutes so as to prohibit or reduce taxes for
422
taxpayers.
In that regard, one of Butler's greatest influences on modern
tax jurisprudence was his advocacy of the canon of interpretation that
ambiguities in tax statutes should be construed in favor of the
taxpayer and against the government. In one of Butler's most
interesting tax opinions, Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., he
invoked that canon to hold that a butter substitute, "Nu-ine," was not
subject to an oleomargarine tax enacted by Congress. 423 According to
Butler, "It [was] elementary that tax laws are to be interpreted
liberally in favor of taxpayers, and that words defining things to be
taxed may not be extended beyond their clear import. Doubts must be
resolved against the government and in favor of taxpayers." 4 24 Butler
applied that canon of construction in at least two other opinions that
he authored. 425 As with his constitutionally based tax opinions,
421. See, e.g., M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, 275 (1938) (employing a
mathematical table in the majority opinion to explain the effect of depreciation on the value of
alterations and improvements paid for by a lessee); Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co., 300 U.S. 481,
493-94 (1937) (using tables to explain the consequences of a commercial transaction); U.S.
Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 511, 513 (1932) (using a table to illustrate the
taxpayer's income, deductions, and reductions from judgment).
422. See, e.g., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 663 (1937) (holding that the taxpayer did not
have to include in his income a payment made from a purchaser of an oil interest because the
assignor was entitled to deduct depletion); Tex-Penn Co., 300 U.S. at 499 (holding that cash
received by the taxpayer from a stock sale was not includable in taxable income); Helvering v.
Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1935) (holding that a taxpayer need not pay an amount shown to
be "arbitrary and excessive" even when he cannot show the exact amount owed in taxes); U.S.
Cartridge Co., 284 U.S. at 520 (holding that the taxpayer could properly deduct the lost value of
buildings and leftover inventory); Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 258, 265 (1931)
(holding that the taxpayer could bring a suit for overpayment of income taxes); V. Loewers
Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson, 282 U.S. 638, 645 (1931) (holding that the taxpayer was
entitled to a deduction as a result of the obsolescence of the company's buildings).
423. 284 U.S. 498, 508, 510-11 (1932). The oleomargarine tax was promulgated to support
the dairy industry by eliminating the competitive price advantage enjoyed by butter substitutes.
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272,
353 (2004).
424. StandardNut, 284 U.S. at 509.
425. See Bonwit Teller, 283 U.S. at 263 (stating that a refund portion of a tax law "is to be
construed liberally in favor of the taxpayers"); Bowers v. N.Y. & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S.
346, 350 (1927) ("[Sluch laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers.").
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however, this canon also lost favor as the Court's personnel changed in
426
the late 1930s.
In his last three years on the Supreme Court, Butler dissented
an astounding seventy-three times, over half of the total number of
occasions that he joined or authored a dissent during his entire tenure
on the Court. It is unsurprising, therefore, that as Butler's frustration
with his colleagues grew, he used increasingly "smoldering language"
to critique his colleagues, especially in tax cases. 42 7 Ultimately, as
Justices Black and Reed replaced more conservative Justices Van
Devanter and Sutherland, respectively, many of Butler's tax opinions
were overruled. Nonetheless, according to one commentator, Butler
"went down fighting, embittered and disgusted, but valiant and
428
uncompromisingly belligerent to the very end."
CONCLUSION

It would be surprising if Pierce Butler showed up on any
constitutional law scholar's list of great Justices. After all, he was a
judicial minimalist who wrote in simple terms and decided only the
case before him. He was surrounded on the Court by Justices who are
lauded as some of the best in our nation's history, including Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis Brandeis. Moreover,
many historians view Butler as a quasi-villain, evidenced by his
standard categorization as one of the so-called "Four Horseman of the
Apocalypse" that impeded the New Deal reforms implemented by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Finally, even in those areas
where he distinguished himself-economic liberty, taxation, private
property rights, and public utilities regulation-many of his opinions

426. See White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938) (stating, over the dissent of Butler
and two other Justices, that the Court was "not impressed by the argument that... all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer"). Although the canon generally laid dormant in
federal courts for more than fifty years after White, it has recently regained favor with Justices
Stevens and Thomas, both of whom discussed it in a 2001 Supreme Court opinion. See United
Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S 822, 839 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Court "should be inclined to rely on the traditional canon that construes
revenue-raising laws against their drafter"); id. at 839 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
Justice Thomas "accurately points to a tradition of cases construing 'revenue-raising laws'
against their drafter"). Moreover, the canon is still invoked relatively frequently by a number of
state courts. E.g., Ex parte Healthsouth Corp., 978 So. 2d 745, 756 (Ala. 2007); Ordlock v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 135 P.3d 628, 633 (Cal. 2006); Maas Bros., Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So. 2d 193,
198 (Fla. 1967); Tax Appeal of Dir. of Taxation v. Med. Underwriters of Cal., 166 P.3d 353, 368
(Haw. 2007); In re 1605 Book Center, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 86, 88 (N.Y. 1994); Qwest Corp. v. City of
Bellevue, 166 P.3d 667, 673 (Wash. 2007).
427. Brown, supra note 17, at 54.
428. Id. at 105.
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were overruled later in his tenure or shortly after his death. He is, as
a result, a neglected Justice.
But in the brief and superficial treatment of him in the
literature,
scholars
have
greatly
oversimplified
or
even
mischaracterized his modest legal contributions. Prior to this Article,
for instance, not a single legal scholar had systematically examined
Justice Butler's jurisprudence in the areas of tax law or public utilities
regulation, the fields in which nearly half of his opinions were written.
Few have noted his surprisingly pro-defendant votes in cases
involving criminal rights or his embrace of robust notions of personal
liberty and private property. An understanding of his views in these
areas of law, which were important to him as a practicing lawyer and
a judge, is essential to understanding his votes in a variety of areas,
including his reasons for strictly adhering to Lochner. For example, it
is relatively clear that Butler's votes in economic liberties cases were
motivated by the laissez-faire, pro-private property, and selfdetermination principles that he learned during his schooling and
from his immigrant parents.
Many of the principles that Butler championed as a Justice are
no longer widely accepted; nonetheless, his influence lingers,
particularly in his areas of specialty. And though it is difficult to
categorize Butler's Supreme Court career as a success from a
historical standpoint, it is equally difficult to classify him as a failure.
He was, after all, a judge who tried to decide the controversies before
him in a narrow, concise, and technical manner.

